




A Resilient Control Approach to Secure Cyber




Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abdollahi Biron, Zoleikha, "A Resilient Control Approach to Secure Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) with an Application on Connected
Vehicles" (2017). All Dissertations. 1869.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1869
A RESILIENT CONTROL APPROACH TO SECURE CYBER PHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS (CPS) WITH AN APPLICATION ON CONNECTED VEHICLES
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Automotive Engineering  
by 
Zoleikha Abdollahi Biron 
May 2017 
Accepted by: 
Dr. Pierluigi Pisu, Committee Chair 
Dr. Richard Brooks, Co-chair 
Dr. Beshah Ayalew 
Dr. Yongqiang Wang 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this dissertation is to develop a resilient control approach to secure 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber-attacks, network failures and potential 
physical faults. Despite being potentially beneficial in several aspects, the connectivity in 
CPSs poses a set of specific challenges from safety and reliability standpoint. The first 
challenge arises from unreliable communication network which affects the 
control/management of overall system. Second, faulty sensors and actuators can degrade 
the performance of CPS and send wrong information to the controller or other subsystems 
of the CPS. Finally, CPSs are vulnerable to cyber-attacks which can potentially lead to 
dangerous scenarios by affecting the information transmitted among various components of 
CPSs. Hence, a resilient control approach is proposed to address these challenges. The 
control approach consists of three main parts:(1) Physical fault diagnostics: This part makes 
sure the CPS works normally while there is no cyber-attacks/ network failure in the 
communication network; (2) Cyber-attack/failure resilient strategy: This part  consists of  a 
resilient strategy for specific cyber-attacks to compensate for their malicious effects ; (3) 
Decision making algorithm: The decision making block identifies the specific existing 
cyber-attacks/ network failure in the system and deploys corresponding control strategy to 
minimize the effect of abnormality in the system performance. In this dissertation, we 
consider a platoon of connected vehicle system under Co-operative Adaptive Cruise Control 
(CACC) strategy as a CPS and develop a resilient control approach to address the 
aforementioned challenges. 
iii 
The first part of this dissertation investigates fault diagnostics of connected vehicles 
assuming ideal communication network. Very few works address the real-time diagnostics 
problem in connected vehicles. This study models the effect of different faults in sensors 
and actuators, and also develops fault diagnosis scheme for detectable and identifiable 
faults. The proposed diagnostics scheme is based on sliding model observers to detect, 
isolate and estimate faults in the sensors and actuators. One of the main advantages of 
sliding model approach lies in applicability to nonlinear systems. Therefore, the proposed 
method can be extended for other nonlinear cyber physical systems as well.  
The second part of the proposed research deals with developing strategies to 
maintain performance of cyber-physical systems close to the normal, in the presence of 
common cyber-attacks and network failures. Specifically, the behavior of Dedicated Short-
Range Communication (DSRC) network is analyzed under cyber-attacks and failures 
including packet dropping, Denial of Service (DOS) attack and false data injection attack. 
To start with, packet dropping in network communication is modeled by Bernoulli random 
variable. Then an observer based modifying algorithm is proposed to modify the existing 
CACC strategy against the effect of packet dropping phenomena. In contrast to the existing 
works on state estimation over imperfect communication network in CPS which mainly use 
either holding previous received data or Kalman filter with intermittent observation, a 
combination of these two approaches is used to construct the missing data over packet 
dropping phenomena. Furthermore, an observer based fault diagnostics based on sliding 
mode approach is proposed to detect, isolate and estimate sensor faults in connected vehicles 
platoon.  
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Next, Denial of Service (DoS) attack is considered on the communication network. 
The effect of DoS attack is modeled as an unknown stochastic delay in data delivery in the 
communication network. Then an observer based approach is proposed to estimate the real 
data from the delayed measured data over the network. A novel approach based on LMI 
theory is presented to design observer and estimate the states of the system via delayed 
measurements. Next, we explore and alternative approach by modeling DoS with unknown 
constant time delay and propose an adaptive observer to estimate the delay. Furthermore, 
we study the effects of system uncertainties on the DoS algorithm. In the third algorithm, 
we considered a general CPS with a saturated DoS attack modeled with constant unknown 
delay. In this part, we modeled the DoS via a PDE and developed a PDE based observer to 
estimate the delay as well as states of the system while the only available measurements are 
delayed.  
Furthermore, as the last cyber-attack of the second part of the dissertation, we 
consider false data injection attack as the fake vehicle identity in the platoon of vehicles. In 
this part, we develop a novel PDE-based modeling strategy for the platoon of vehicles 
equipped with CACC.  Moreover, we propose a PDE based observer to detect and isolate 
the location of the false data injection attack injected into the platoon as fake identity.   
Finally, the third part of the dissertation deals with the ongoing works on an 
optimum decision making strategy formulated via Model Predictive Control (MPC). The 
decision making block is developed to choose the optimum strategy among available 
strategies designed in the second part of the dissertation.  
v 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents whose value to me only grows with age.
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I would like to extend my gratitude towards my advisor Prof. Pierluigi Pisu 
whose valuable guidance has been instrumental throughout my Ph.D. program. His 
excellent teaching and mentorship helped me understand big picture in context to a 
particular research domain as well as the depth of the technical details. These aspects were 
particularly helpful when crafting my research proposal in terms of scope and specific 
algorithms. His knowledge of systems theory, insightful suggestions and critical feedback 
have been very helpful during my research. I have learnt a lot about technical writing under 
his mentorship. His teaching on fault diagnosis of dynamic systems and sliding mode 
theory have been extremely helpful during my research. I am also thankful to him for the 
long hours he spent with me discussing several minute aspects of “convergence proofs”. 
Next, my appreciation extends to Prof. Richard Brooks for being my committee member. 
His teaching and knowledge on network security extremely helpful during my research. I 
am thankful to him for the hours he spent with me discussing regarding to the selected 
control- oriented approaches from network security perspectives. Those discussions have 
been really helpful in solidifying my technical concepts on systems, controls and network 
security. Lastly, his continuous support during the program is sincerely appreciated. I 
would also thank Prof. Beshah Ayalew for his support during my Ph.D. program. Dr. 
Ayalew was so dedicated to spend his valuable time to proofread my conference and 
journal papers along with his critical feedbacks. I have worked with Dr. Ayalew as his 
teaching assistant which has provided me with a large set of teaching skills. I also want to 
thank him for the many letters of recommendation he wrote for me for various scholarships 
vii 
and awards. Next, I would like to thank my committee member Prof. Yongqiang Wang for 
their insightful questions and critical feedback that helped making this dissertation a better 
one.  
Next, I would like to express my gratitude to my beloved siblings for their supports 
in my whole life. I would like to thank my dearest sister Roghieh for her endless kindness 
and caring. She is the most awesome, supportive and inspiring sister in the world. I would 
like to thank Maryam for all her pure love, Soraya for her motivating words encouraging 
me to face challenges with confidence. I would like to thank my amazing sister, my best 
friend and best part of me, Laila for all her sacrificing and devotions. I am thankful of my 
brother Abdollah for all his enthusiastic perspectives he spreads into the family and Reza 
and Darab for all they have done for me.  
At last but not least, I would like to acknowledge my dear friends Dr. Satadru Dey 
and Dr. Sara Mohon. Satadru’s guidance and technical discussions along with detailed 
explanations made several concepts clearer for me; and Sara’s excellent pieces of advice 
eased PhD life’s challenges for me.  
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TITLE PAGE ....................................................................................................................... i 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
DEDICATION .....................................................................................................................v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xiv 
PUBLICATIONS .................................................................................................................1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION..................................................................................4 
1.1. Research Objectives .................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2. Research Motivation .................................................................................................................. 7 
1.3. Research Contributions ........................................................................................................... 10 
1.4. Dissertation Organization ........................................................................................................ 12 
CHAPTER TWO: WORKING PRINCIPLE AND MODELING OF CONNECTED 
VEHICLES ................................................................................................................................. 13 
2.1. Working Principle ................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2. Modeling ................................................................................................................................. 13 
CHAPTER THREE: SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS ................. 18 
3.1. Physical Fault Diagnostics Problem ........................................................................................ 19 
3.2. Cyber Attacks/Network Failures Problem ............................................................................... 23 
3.3. Brief Review of Existing Fault Diagnosis and Observer Design Approaches ........................ 32 
CHAPTER FOUR: PHYSICAL FAULT DIAGNOSTICS ALGORITHM .................................. 34 
4.1. State Space Modeling .............................................................................................................. 35 
ix 
4.2. Diagnostics Scheme................................................................................................................. 36 
4.3. Simulation studies ................................................................................................................... 40 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD PACKET DROP OUT ....................... 44 
5.1. Packet Dropping Modeling...................................................................................................... 44 
5.2. Proposed Strategy .................................................................................................................... 45 
5.3. Simulation Studies ................................................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER SIX: RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK  ...... 52 
6.1. Strategy Number One .............................................................................................................. 53 
6.1.1 DoS Attack Modeling…………………………………………………………………….…53 
6.1.2. Diagnostics Algorithm…………………………………………………………..…….…....57 
6.1.3. Results and Discussion……………………………………………………………………..65 
6.2. Strategy Number Two ............................................................................................................. 69 
6.2.1. DoS Attack Modeling………………………………………………………………………70 
6.2.2. Real-time Detection and Estimation Scheme for DoS Attack………………………….…..71 
6.2.3. Simulation Studies…………………………………………………………………….……78 
6.3. Strategy Number Three ..................................................................................................... …..88 
6.3.1. Problem Statement……………………………………………………………………….…89 
6.3.2. Estimation Algorithm………………………………………………………………………91 
6.3.3. Simulation Results and Discussion…………………………………………………….….100 
CHAPTER SEVEN: RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD FALSE DATA INJECTION 
ATTACK .................................................................................................................................. 108 
7.1. PDE Modeling of the Platoon (Combine with attack) ........................................................... 109 
7.2. Diagnostics Approach ........................................................................................................... 119 
7.3. Attack Diagnostics ................................................................................................................ 126 
7.4. Results and Discussion .......................................................................................................... 129 
Case 1: No Fault Scenario………………………………………………………………….……130 
Case 2: Fault Data Injection Scenario……………………………………………………………139 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DECISION MAKING ................................................................................. 142 
Page 
x 
8.1. Problem Formulation ............................................................................................................. 142 
8.2. Simulation results .................................................................................................................. 144 
CHAPTER NINE: SUMMERY AND FUTURE WORKS ......................................................... 149 
9.1. Dissertation Summery ........................................................................................................... 149 
9.2. Future Works ......................................................................................................................... 153 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 154 
Page 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
Figure 1: Cyber physical systems and schematic representation of it. ....................................... 5 
Figure 2: Potential cyber-attacks for a subsystem of CPS ......................................................... 6 
Figure 3: Vulnerabilities in a smart car .................................................................................... 10 
Figure 4: Flow of hacking a car via smart phone ..................................................................... 10 
Figure 5: Platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC. ............................................................... 15 
Figure 6: Block scheme of the CACC system .......................................................................... 17 
Figure 7: Overview of proposed scheme to secure a CPS ....................................................... 19 
Figure 8: Fault diagnostics scheme for connected vehicles ..................................................... 37 
Figure 9: (a) Injected and estimated velocity sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 3 m/s and 
injection time t=450 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) under the 
velocity sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 
2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. ........................................................................... 42 
Figure 10: (a) Injected and estimated range sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 1.5 m and 
injection time t=350 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) under the range 
sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) 
CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. ............................................................................... 42 
Figure 11: Physical faults and failures signatures .................................................................... 43 
Figure 12: Packet dropping strategy for connected vehicles combined with physical fault 
diagnostics ..................................................................................................................................... 46 
Figure 13. Velocity profile of US06 Driving cycle .................................................................. 49 
Figure 14: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3), with different probabilities 
of packet drop out in the communication network. ....................................................................... 51 
Figure 15: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) with the probability of 
packet drop out 𝜆 = 0.2, under two cases: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) 
CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. ............................................................................... 51 
Figure 16: Modeling of Denial of Service attack on signal 𝑎𝑖 − 1 .......................................... 56 
Figure 17: DoS strategy schematic for connected vehicles to modify CACC ......................... 58 
Figure 18: States of vehicle 3, 𝑑3, 𝑣3 and 𝑎3 in ideal network (blue), under attack with normal 
CACC (red), with modified CACC which uses estimated signals of vehicle 2 𝑢2 = [𝑣2, 𝑎2] .... 68 
xii 
Figure 19: States of vehicle 3, zoomed results for 𝑡 = [290 350], before occurrence of DoS 
and after that. ................................................................................................................................. 68 
Figure 20. DoS attack detection and estimation scheme. ......................................................... 71 
Figure 21. Residual probability distribution under no attack condition ................................... 78 
Figure 22: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS Attacks in DSRC Network
 ....................................................................................................................................................... 80 
Figure 23: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under normal DSRC Network .......... 81 
Figure 24: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3denotes actual value and 𝜂 
denotes estimated value. ................................................................................................................ 82 
Figure 25: Network induced delay and estimation of the delay in normal DSRC Network .... 82 
Figure 26: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS attack in DSRC network . 84 
Figure 27: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3denotes actual value and 𝜂 
denotes estimated value. ................................................................................................................ 84 
Figure 28: Delay estimation under DoS attack ........................................................................ 85 
Figure 29: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the 
parameter 𝑘𝑝. The scenario is based on Case 4. ............................................................................ 86 
Figure 30: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the 
parameter𝑘𝑑. The scenario is based on Case 5. ............................................................................ 87 
Figure 31: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in 
𝑉𝑖 measurement. The scenario is based on Case 6. ....................................................................... 88 
Figure 32. A distributed CPS with a shared network. .............................................................. 89 
Figure 33.  A schematic of a sub-plant of the distributed CPS. ............................................... 90 
Figure 34.  The schematic of the proposed algorithm. ............................................................. 92 
Figure 35. System performance in presence of delay ............................................................ 101 
Figure 36. Estimated delay. .................................................................................................... 103 
Figure 37. Delay estimation error .......................................................................................... 103 
Figure 38. Measured and estimated output. ........................................................................... 104 
Figure 39. Estimation error .................................................................................................... 105 
Figure 40. Original and estimated values of 𝑧𝑥, 𝑡 = 𝑧1(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑧2(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑇 ................................. 105 
Figure 41. Predicted states of the system at time 𝑡. ................................................................ 107 
Figure 42. Prediction errors of Observer II ............................................................................ 107 
Figure 43 : A platoon of CACC. ............................................................................................ 110 
Page 
xiii 
Figure 44: Platoon with vehicles moving in a single lane (a) A platoon with leader and 
follower vehicles. (b) Same platoon in 𝑦 coordinates. ................................................................ 113 
Figure 45: Velocity perturbation in the platoon ..................................................................... 131 
Figure 46: Estimated velocity perturbation in the platoon ..................................................... 132 
Figure 47: Estimation error for velocity perturbation in the platoon ..................................... 133 
Figure 48: Actual acceleration perturbation in the platoon .................................................... 134 
Figure 49: Estimated acceleration perturbation in the platoon ............................................... 135 
Figure 50: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation in the platoon ............................... 135 
Figure 51: Actual density perturbation in the platoon ............................................................ 137 
Figure 52: Estimated density perturbation in the platoon ...................................................... 137 
Figure 53: Estimation error for density perturbation in the platoon ....................................... 138 
Figure 54: Residual probabilty desnity for thereshold setting ............................................... 139 
Figure 55: Estimation error for velocity perturbation under false data attack injection ......... 140 
Figure 56: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation under false data attack injection .. 141 
Figure 57: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation as residual 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) under false data 
attack injection ............................................................................................................................ 141 
Figure 58: Hybrid system scheme .......................................................................................... 142 
Figure 59: Relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), DSRC under 
attack while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack and no strategy 
applied (black) and DSRC under attack while DoS attack strategy applied (dashed red). .......... 145 
Figure 60: Visulaized relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC and under attack.
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 146 
Figure 61: Acceleration the Vehicle 3 (control signal) under ideal DSRC and under attack 
while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack and no strategy 
applied (black) and DSRC under attack while DoS attack strategy applied (dashed red). .......... 146 
Figure 62: Behavior of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), and DSRC under 
attack scenario with resilient control strategies applied via optimum decision making algorithm 
(red). ............................................................................................................................................ 147 
Figure 63: Selected control action during US06 driving cycle via decision making block. .. 148 
Page 
xiv 




 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu, “Sensor and Actuator Fault Detection of Connected Vehicles
under imperfect Communication Network”, World Academy of Science, Engineering
and Technology, International Journal of Computer, Electrical, Automation, Control
and Information Engineering 10.6 (2016): 968-974.
 S. Dey, Z. A. Biron, S. Tatipamula, N. Das, S. Mohon, P. Pisu, and B. Ayalew, “Model-
based Real-time Thermal Fault Diagnosis of Lithium-ion Batteries” , Journal of Control
Engineering Practice, 56 (2016): 37-48.
 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu, “Observer Design for State Estimation in Cyber Physical
Systems with Unknown Delay in Measurements” under review in International Journal
of Control.
 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu, “Real-time False Data Injection Attack Detection in
Connected Vehicle Systems with PDE modelling”, submitted to IEEE Transaction on
Control System Technology.
 Z. Abdollahi, S. Dey, and P. Pisu, “Real-time Detection and Estimation of Denial of
Service Attack in Connected Vehicle Systems”, submitted to IEEE Transaction on
Intelligent Transportation System.
 L.Qiu, Z. Abdollahi, L. Qian, Z. Du, P. Pisu, “Engine map based predictive fuel




 L. Qiu, P. Chen, L. Qian, Z. Abdollahi, P. Pisu “Predictive Fuel Efficient Control
Strategies for a Group of Connected Vehicles Considering Vertical Vibration”, under
review in Science China Technological Sciences
Conference Proceedings: 
 Z. Abdollahi, B. HomChaudhuri and P. Pisu, "Observer Design Based Cyber Security
for Cyber Physical Systems", Cyber and Information Security Research Conference,
2015.
 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu, “Distributed Fault Detection and Estimation for Cooperative
Adaptive Cruise Control System in a Platoon,” PHM conference, 2015.
 Z. Abdollahi, S.Dey, and P. Pisu,” Sensor Fault Diagnosis of Connected Vehicles under
imperfect Communication Network“, DSCC 2016.
 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu,” Sensor and Actuator Fault Detection of Connected Vehicles
under imperfect Communication Network“, Accepted in 18th International Conference
on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2016.
 Z. Abdollahi, S.Dey, and P. Pisu, “On Resilient Connected Vehicles under Denial of
Service “, American Control Conference 2016.
 Z. Abdollahi, and P. Pisu, “Observer-Based Diagnostic Scheme for Lithium-Ion
Batteries,” In Proceedings of the ASME 2015 Dynamic Systems Control Conference
(DSCC), October 28-30, 2015, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 2015.
 S. Dey, Z. A. Biron, S. Tatipamula, N. Das, S. Mohon, P. Pisu, and B. Ayalew, “On-
board Thermal Fault Diagnosis of Lithium-ion Batteries for Hybrid Electric Vehicle
3 
Application,” In Proceedings of the IFAC Workshop on Engine and Powertrain Control, 




1.1. Research Objectives 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) represent a diverse class of systems with various 
applications in critical industrial systems as well as infrastructures such as power grids [1], 
water distribution systems [2]-[3], Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)[4]-[5], building 
automation and many other systems vital for human well-being [5]. In general, CPS denoted 
to a certain category of systems containing three main parts: (i) Physical plants, (ii) 
Controller and (iii) Communication network (see Fig. 1). Connectivity among different 
subsystems and the controller via communication network makes CPS faster, more efficient 
and cost effective.  Indeed, communication network eases data transfer process between 
sensors to controller and controller to actuators. Furthermore, shared communication 
network is less expensive comparing to wired network of private communication network 
for each subsystem.  However, due to the control center and multi-purpose communication 
network, critical cyber physical systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and network failures 




Figure 1: Cyber physical systems and schematic representation of it. 
Cyber-attacks, network failures and physical faults (in the physical parts of the CPS) 
are potential causes that degrade the performance of the cyber physical systems. Physical 
fault diagnostics of CPS is possible by utilizing the following approaches: 1) model-based 
approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and 3) Knowledge-based approaches. 
In contrast, from the system control perspective, security and resiliency of cyber physical 
systems against cyber-attacks and network failures is more challenging due to the 
unexpected inherent of cyber-attacks. Some of the common network failures and possible 
cyber-attacks in CPS referring to the existing literatures are packet drop out [7]-[8], Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack [9]-[10], replay attack [11] and false data injection [12].   
Resiliency of cyber physical systems is indeed a 3S-oriented design, that is, stability, 
security, and systematicness: Stability means the CPS can achieve a stable sensing-actuation 
close-loop control even though the inputs (sensing data) have noise or attacks; Security 
means that the system can overcome the cyber–physical interaction attacks; and 
Systematicness means that the system has a seamless integration of sensors and actuators. 
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There two main approaches to tackle the security problem of cyber physical systems: (i) 
computer science methods (ii) Control oriented methods.  
Some of the most common cyber-attacks modeled in CPS in control oriented frame 
works are depicted in Fig. 3. In majority of the modeling approaches, the CPS is is 
considered as a linear time invariant (LTI) system or descriptor system. 
 
Figure 2: Potential cyber-attacks for a subsystem of CPS 
Referring to the control oriented attack analysis in CPS, the false information can 
include: an incorrect measurement, an incorrect time when the measurement was observed, 
or an incorrect sender id. The adversary can launch these attacks by obtaining the secret key 
or by compromising some sensors (A1) or controllers (A3). A2 and A4 represent denial of 
service (DoS) attacks where the adversary prevents the controller from receiving sensor 
measurements or sending an input update. To launch a DoS the adversary can jam the 
communication channels, compromise devices and prevent them from sending data, attack 
the routing protocols, etc. A5 represents a direct attack (false data injection) against the 
actuators or an external physical attack on the plant. Along with cyber-attacks and network 
failures (such as packet dropping), CPSs subject to physical failures and faults. To secure 
cyber physical systems against cyber-attacks, we need to make sure that anomaly in CPS 
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performance is not caused by physical faults of the system. Hence, as a pre-requisite for 
securing the CPS, a fault diagnostics algorithm is designed to detect potential faults in the 
system [9]. 
In light of the above discussion, the objective of this proposed research is to develop 
a general approach that improves the performance of cyber physical systems making them 
more resilient to cyber-attacks/ network failures as well as physical failures. Hence, for each 
possible cyber-attacks/network failure, an algorithm to modify the controller of system and 
maintain the performance of whole CPS close to normal is presented. Also, along with 
modified controllers, a fault diagnosis scheme is presented to detect, isolate and estimate 
physical faults in CPS. Furthermore, as the last part of thesis, we develop a decision making 
strategy to switch among available control signals to choose the optimum control strategy 
which guarantees the smoothness of the performance as well as safety. As a case study of 
this approach, a platoon of connected vehicles communicating through Dedicated Short-
Range Communication (DSRC) network is considered.  
1.2. Research Motivation 
In recent years, we have noticed a rise of smart vehicles with capabilities like 
wireless communication, gateways and driving assistance systems. Such smart vehicular 
advancements have led to several emerging vehicular technologies. One of such 
technologies as a particular focus of this research is connected vehicles which is classified 
as a distributed cyber physical system.  Indeed the concept of the connectivity in vehicular 
network can potentially results in improvements, e.g. minimizing the risk of accident and 
 8 
increasing traffic throughput. However, this connectivity also introduces new challenges 
from security point of view.  
In modern transportation systems, smart vehicles are not isolated mechanical 
devices with merely mobility purposes anymore. Nowadays, smart vehicles are equipped 
with wireless gateways, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection enabling them to connect and 
communicate with external world [13]-[14]. Hence, by developing the communication 
capabilities to peer to peer, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
communication, the new promising technology as connected vehicles will emerge which, 
essentially, can improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of the overall 
transportation system. However, similar to other CPSs, this technology suffers from several 
challenges, mainly from safety and reliability point of view and is vulnerable to the 
aforementioned cyber-attacks and network failures [15]-[16]. 
Hacking the smart vehicles is not an impossible mission and several existing 
literature explore the vulnerabilities of the smart car regarding to cyber-attack and hacking 
issues. In [13]-[14], and [17] vulnerabilities of car regarding to the Control Area Network 
(CAN) bus are explored. Although for the aforementioned vulnerabilities having physical 
access to the car and more specifically to the On-Board Diagnostics, attacker do not limit 
themselves to having physical access to the car. Indeed, comprehensive studies in University 
of California San Diego, University of Washingtonand University of South Carolina reveal 
that, car hacking without physical access is possible [20]-[18]. In [20], authors present a 
privacy and security evaluation of wireless Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) using 
both laboratory experiments with isolated tire pressure sensor modules and experiments 
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with a complete vehicle system. Fig. 3 shows existing vulnerabilities of a smart car to 
potential cyber-attacks. 
Since each individual smart car is already vulnerable to cyber-attacks, the threat is 
more critical when a group of vehicles share their information through communication 
network together as connected vehicles. Fig. 4 explains the potential threat through the 
internet and telematics units to compromise data in connected vehicles. More specifically, 
connected vehicular networks are vulnerable to packet dropping [21], communication 
induced delay [22], scheduling issues and malicious cyber-attacks [23]. Hence, the vehicular 
control systems must be capable of handling and surviving such adverse situations.  The 
outcome of these researches support importance of the treat of cyber-attacks in connected 
vehicles that can be injected to the communication network via a hacked car or with a 
malicious car generating fake identity. A crucial need for designing the in-vehicle 
control/management systems that takes such issues into consideration and maintains the 
safety and reliability of the overall system does exist in automotive industries. 
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Figure 3: Vulnerabilities in a smart car  
 
Figure 4: Flow of hacking a car via smart phone 
 
1.3. Research Contributions 
The main contribution is the development of control oriented algorithm to provide 
resiliency in cyber physical systems toward physical faults, network failures and cyber-
attacks. This algorithm is an observer based methodology consisting different strategy for 
different attack scenarios. The best strategy is selected via optimum decision making block 
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to apply the best available control strategy to the system to maintain the performance under 
failure or attack.  To fulfill this objective, the following contributions are obtained: 
 The development of Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) based and Partial 
Differential Equation (PDE) based models of connected vehicles for behavior 
analysis under various cyber-attacks and network failures.  
 The development of a fault diagnosis algorithm that detects, isolates and 
estimates specific sensor faults (relative distance and velocity sensors) and 
actuator failures (acceleration pedal) in connected vehicles. 
 The development of estimation algorithm that estimates the lost pack in the 
packet dropping phenomena to provide the correct information to the controller. 
So, the control action maintains resiliency against packet drop incident.   
 The development resilient algorithms against DoS attack in the communication 
network. These algorithms consist of three methodologies for different modeling 
of DoS attack.  
 The development of novel method to model false data injection attack in cyber 
physical systems as fake node (ghost node).  
 The development of PDE based diagnostics algorithm to detect and isolate the 
false injection attack into the system.  
 The development of optimum decision making methodology to select the best in 
the fault/ cyber-attack occurrence in the system to maintain the performance of the 
system close to the normal condition. 
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1.4. Dissertation Organization 
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows. Chapter2 includes a brief overview 
of connected vehicles modeling and working principals. Chapter 3 discusses the security 
problems in cyber physical systems along with state of the art literature review, gap analysis 
and a brief review on fault diagnostics and observer design tools. In Chapter 4 provides the 
proposed algorithm for physical fault diagnostics including faults detection, isolation and 
estimation. Then, Chapter 5 discusses the proposed algorithm on packet dropping 
phenomena as network failure. Chapter 5 includes three algorithms on DoS attack detection 
and estimation along with resiliency to the attack. In Chapter 6, a PDE model of connected 
vehicles along with novel approach for false data injection attack detection is provided. 
Chapter 7 explain the decision making strategy for the aforementioned algorithms. Finally, 




WORKING PRINCIPLE AND MODELING OF CONNECTED VEHICLES 
 
2.1. Working Principle 
Some principal simplifying assumptions which will hold for the duration of all our analysis 
in this proposed research are as the following: 
1- A single lane highway only is considered; multi-lane scenarios with lane changing 
effects are not considered.  
2- We assume that the characteristics of all vehicles and drivers are the same. This 
assumption simplifies calculations but is probably not necessary for our analysis to 
work. 
3- DSRC communication network is a shared broadcasting network. Therefore, each 
vehicle in the platoon is required to listen to the safety messages communicated in 
the specific time slot dedicated to safety messages. 
 
2.2. Modeling 
The car-following methodology for the simulation and analysis of highway traffic 
models vehicles as discrete entities moving in continuous space. Referring to the existing 
works, two common car-following methodologies are Gipps’s model and Adaptive Cruise 
Control (ACC).  Gipp’s model contains a number of parameters which purport to model 
different behavioral features of driver, and is thus rather more complicated than the 
reductionist models which can be found in the mathematical literatures. However, Gipps’s 
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model which is explained in detail in [24]-[25], still too mathematical for control purposes. 
In contrast to Gipps’s model a simplified control oriented car-modeling used in several 
existing literatures is ACC [26]-[28]. In the current existing Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) 
system, the range (i.e., relative distance) and range rate to the preceding vehicle are 
measured with a radar or LIDAR sensor [26]. While, Cooperative Cruise Control (CCC) 
[15]-[16] and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [29]-[33][33]are essentially a 
vehicle-following control methodology that automatically accelerates and decelerates so as 
to keep a desired distance to the preceding vehicle. To do this, in addition to onboard sensors 
like radars, vehicles should be equipped with wireless communication devices, such as 
Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC), to receive extra information of the 
preceding vehicle(s).  
The use of CACC control strategy, especially in heavy duty vehicles, can cause 
lower traffic flow in roads. To achieve this task, onboard sensors such as radar are employed 
that measures relative distance and velocity between vehicles. Further, additional 
information of preceding vehicle(s), such as the desired acceleration is received through the 
wireless communication network. In a cooperative setting, a vehicle should adjust its speed/ 
acceleration using the information from multiple vehicles ahead and behind. To address this 
objective several control strategies are considered to be implemented in the vehicle to use 
the receiving information for vehicle in front and behind, combine them with current states 
of the car and generate corresponding control input for vehicle. Some of the most important 
control approaches in cooperative adaptive cruise control are model predictive [33], and 
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PID [30]-[31] controller. Among these controller, the PID is the most common and more 
effective and less computationally burden.  
Following similar notation of [30], a homogenous platoon of 𝑚 vehicle equipped 
with CACC strategy is considered as the case study of this proposed research (see Fig. 5).  
 
Figure 5: Platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC. 
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where 
m
S  stands for set of all vehicles in the platoon of length of m. 
1i i i i
d q q L

     is the 
distance between vehicle i  and 1i  , where iq  and 1iq  are the rear bumper position of 
vehicle i  and 1i  , respectively, and iL  is the length of vehicle i ; iv  is the velocity and ia  
is the acceleration of vehicle i . Moreover, iu is the vehicle input, to be interpreted as 
desired acceleration, and  is the time constant representing the driveline dynamics. Also, 
the following control policy for the inter-vehicle spacing is adopted: 
, ( ) ( ), \{1}r i i md t hv t i S   (2) 
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where 
,r id  is the desired distance between vehicle i  and 1i  , h is the time headway. The 
main objective is to regulate the 
id  to , ( )r i td  , i.e.,   
,( ) ( ) ( ) 0i i r ie t d t d t as t     (3) 
without losing the generality, we consider 0iL   for simplicity. Substituting the equation 
1i i i i
d q q L

    in (3), the regulating error can be re-written as: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i ie t q t q t hv t    (4) 
The following dynamic controller is considered to achieve the zero regulation error: 
1
1 1 1
( )i i p i d i iu u k e k e u
h h h
   
 (5) 
where 1iu  is the desired acceleration for the preceding vehicle. This information is 
communicated through the DSRC network, hence, it is subject to packet drop failure in the 
network.
pk and dk are the controller coefficients. Furthermore, it is shown that for a 
bounded 1iu   and subject to following constraints on the controller gains: , 0p pk k  , the 
inter-vehicle distance id  is regulated to ,i rd  as defined by spacing policy (2)[31]. 
The block diagram of the closed- loop system for vehicle i, subject to the controller is 
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Figure 6: Block scheme of the CACC system 
 
TABLE I: Vehicle platooning model nomenclature 
Symbol Definition and Unit Symbol Definition and Unit 
𝑑𝑟,𝑖  reference relative distance 𝑇𝑠  network sampling time 
ℎ time headway. 𝜒(𝑘) 
a variable that represents the packet drop out 
phenomenon at time instant 𝑘 
𝑒𝑖(𝑡) error 𝑢𝑖  control input of vehicle 𝑖 
𝑢𝑖−1 
the desired acceleration for the preceding 
vehicle (vehicle 𝑖 − 1) 𝜏 time constant 
𝑘𝑝 controller coefficients 𝜃𝑑  equivalent output error injection 
𝑘𝑑  controller coefficients 𝜃𝑣  equivalent output error injection 
𝑑𝑖  inter-vehicle distance   
Superscript 
± positive/negative electrode 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
As it mentioned in the introduction section, cyber physical systems are subject to 
physical faults, network failures and cyber-attack. To secure a CPS against these potential 
sources of performance degradation, a control oriented algorithm is proposed. The 
algorithm contains three main parts: (1) Physical fault diagnostics; (2) Cyber-attacks/failure 
resilient strategies; (3) Decision making.   
1) Physical Faults Diagnostics: This part includes an observer based fault diagnostics 
scheme to address issues regarding to the potential physical faults and failures in 
hardware components in the CPS. 
2) Cyber-attacks/network failure resilient strategies: This component acts as a state 
machine system with several strategies designed for specific cyber-attacks or 
network failure. Each strategy is designed by utilizing different control theory tools 
e.g. observer design, adaptive control, and sliding mode theory.  These 
methodologies are used to design resilient strategies for CPS to maintain the 
functionality of CPS and keep its performance close to the normal when cyber-
attacks occur. Hence, by applying corresponding strategy, the CPS will be resilient 
to that specific attack or network failure.  
3) Decision maker: Since all strategies in the Cyber resilient component are 
independent from each other, to apply the best strategy for the existing cyber-attack 
or network failure, a decision needs to be made. To obtain this objective a decision 
making block based on Model Predictive Control (MPC) is designed.  At each 
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sample time, the decision maker block chooses best available control action 
designed in the previous part while guaranteeing smooth behavior of CPS.  
The overview of this research is depicted in Fig.7. In the following each of this 
component with their design approach will be discussed in details.   
 
Figure 7: Overview of proposed scheme to secure a CPS 
 
Next, we have a literature review for each component in more detail to provide the existing 
research gaps. 
3.1. Physical Fault Diagnostics Problem  
3.1.1. Problem Formulation and Challenges 
Similar to any physical systems, cyber physical systems are subjected to physical 
faults in their components including sensors and actuators and hardware. To secure the CPS 
against cyber-attacks, normal operation of CPS in no cyber-attacks condition should be 
guaranteed. This is important due to the connectivity of different parts of a CPS which can 
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causes to propagate the error of one part to other components of CPS. In more detailed 
explanation, small error in a sensor readings which is transmitted and propagated to several 
controller of supplants of a CPS can compromise performance of those sub-plants and 
interpreted as cyber-attacks while in reality there is no cyber-threat in the system. Similarly, 
in our case study of connected vehicles, wrong velocity sensor or acceleration information 
can be transmitted to follower vehicles and degrade their control strategy and provide an 
error in regulating the desire distance. Consequently, the error propagation inside the string 
of the platoon can treat the stability of sting by either breaking the platoon or causing 
accident in the platoon.  Hence, reliability of CPS is a critical issue that need to be addressed. 
Different failure mechanisms can occur in a CPS during operation, but, the most important 
and significant ones relate to sensor and actuator faults. Some of these faults, if not detected 
or isolated, may lead to catastrophic failures. At a higher level, diagnostic problem in a CPS 
can be classified into three types based on the component where the failure occurs: sensor 
fault, process/system fault, actuation fault.  
In a broad classification, existing approaches can be divided into three groups: 1) 
Model-based approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and 3) Knowledge-based 
approaches. Model-based approaches utilize a dynamic model of the system in their 
diagnostic algorithm. Signal processing based approaches use different kinds of spectral 
analysis, time series analysis and statistical methods such as pattern recognition, feature 
extraction etc. In knowledge based approaches, a priori knowledge of the system is used 
along with some reasoning algorithms. In this discussion, we will concentrate on model-
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based diagnostic approaches due to the availability of the dynamic model of most of the 
CPSs. 
3.1.2. Literature Review 
In this research, we focus on model-based fault diagnostics approach to detect, 
isolate faults and failures in CPS. In the model-based diagnostics a dynamic model of the 
system is used to predict the output which is compared to the measured signals from the 
physical system. The difference between the measured data and predicted data is used to 
generate a residual signal which has the idealized property of being zero in case of no faults 
and nonzero in presence of faults. This residual signal is then processed further to achieve 
isolation of the detected faults. Model-based designs of fault diagnosis scheme follow the 
sequential steps: system and fault modeling, fault detectability analysis, residual generation, 
fault isolation and decision making. Surveys of different model-based schemes can be found 
in [34]-[35]. Faults generally occur in sensors, actuators or in the process. Actuator and 
sensor faults are generally modeled as additive deviations from the nominal model whereas 
process faults are generally modeled as multiplicative faults which reflect as changes in 
parameters. In our case study as CPS, the potential faults and failures can occur in vehicles 
actuators and sensor measurements which are transmitted to other vehicles in the platooning 
network via DSRC.  
Vehicle diagnostics are widely explored and is one of the utmost interest for 
automotive industries and OEMS. Hence, several researches for improving the functionality 
of On-Board Diagnostics (OBD_II) are going on. However, unlike fault diagnostics on 
engine operation which is explored widely, kinematic characteristics of the vehicle such 
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velocity sensor, radar sensor faults as well as acceleration pedal failure are not considered 
in the on-board diagnostics [36]-[37].In the intelligent transportation where a vehicle shares 
its information among other vehicles in the vehicular network, wrong information not only 
treat the safety of individual car, but also, it can threaten other vehicles performance. Faulty 
sensors can affect the individual vehicle’s safe operation and in turn will create a potentially 
unsafe node in the vehicular network. Nevertheless, there are very few literatures address 
this issue of connected vehicles. [38], presents an approach to address some of the 
challenges in connected vehicle system fault diagnostics, such as the diagnostics of 
unexpected faults, and infrequent or intermittent faults.  However, the existing literatures 
do not consider potential faults in the sensor measurements which can be transmitted 
through the DSRC communication network to other vehicles in the vehicular network.  In 
this research, we address the sensor and actuator fault detection and analyze the 
identifiability of these faults and failures in connected vehicles. 
3.1.2. Gaps in Existing Literature 
 There is no complete research on connected vehicles fault diagnostics with specific 
focus on sensor and actuator fault detection which their data is transmitted through 
communication network.  
 No fault estimation approach to compensate the effect of existing faults in the 
system and design fault tolerant control.  
 Most of the existing model-based fault detection approaches have one or more of 
the following issues: 1) utilize a linearized model, 2) are computationally 
expensive, and 3) lack theoretical guarantees of the convergence of the estimator. 
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3.2. Cyber Attacks/Network Failures Problem  
3.2.1. Problem Formulation and Challenges 
The performance of CPS highly relies on the reliability of its communication 
network specifically if there is no physical malfunctioning in the system. Hence, providing 
good maintenance on the hardware of the CPS and health monitoring via fault diagnostics 
approaches, guarantees the physical performance of a CPS. However, cyber-attacks, 
malicious adversaries and network failure are still some of the crucial sources of 
performance degradation in cyber physical systems which are not possible to detect via 
physical fault diagnostics methods.  
One of the most common failure in the communication network is packet dropping 
phenomena.  Wireless links are known to be prone to errors and failures. Packet dropping 
occurs due to a number of factors including occasional hardware failures, degradation in 
link quality, and channel congestion etc. Although many network protocols have re-
transmission mechanisms embedded, for real-time feedback control data, it may be 
advantageous to discard the failed packets on their first transmission because re-transmitted 
packets may have too large latency to be useful [39]. Re-transmission may also delay the 
transmission of new packets. In a typical CPS, due to limited computing power of the 
communication modules, error correction techniques are not common on the lower network 
levels. However, cyber-attacks are not considered as network failures and in fact they have 
designed smartly by attacker. Hence, modeling the cyber-attacks from control perspective 
is more challenging than network failures and requires detailed analyses over network and 
attacker capabilities. The most common cyber-attacks on CPS referring to the existing 
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literature consists of Denial of Service (DoS) attack, False Data Injection attack (or 
deception attack), Replay attack and Stealthy attack.  
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are perhaps the most detrimental attack to CPSs that 
affects the packet delivery because they have been proven capable of shutting an 
organization off from the Internet or dramatically slowing down network links [40]. 
Definition of DoS attack may vary in different studies on DoS attack, however, all these 
studies describe the effect of DoS attack as the same. The violation of availability of sensor 
and control data is known as denial-of-service (DoS). DoS attacks can be classified into 
several different types, in which the packet flooding attack and data jamming or 
compromising by a malicious adversary are prevalent [41]-[42]. Attackers may flood a 
network with a large volume of data to deliberately consume the limited resources, such as 
CPU cycles, memory, network bandwidth, and packet buffers. Consequently, time delay 
and packet loss of transmitted information in CPS become worse under such attacks, which 
in turn may significantly impair the system performance. False data injection attack is a 
well-studied attack in cyber physical systems particularly in recent years.  In false  data 
injection  attack  scenario,  the  attacker  has  the  capability  to corrupt the original message 
by injecting additional false data into the actual value. The message either is transmitted 
form sensors to the controller or from the controller to actuators [43]. The attacker in the 
replay attack intercepts data of the system and re-transmits it while corrupting the 
performance of the system [44] . Another cyber-attack studied in the cyber physical systems 
is stealthy attack. In the stealthy attack, the attacker wishes to induce perturbation in the 
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control loop by compromising a subset of the sensors and injecting an exogenous control 
input, without incurring detection from an anomaly detector [45].  
With every day new emerging technologies, new cyber-attacks are developed and it 
is not possible to keep track of all existing cyber-attacks in one research. However, the effect 
of the majority of these attacks can be modeled with one or several of these existing 
dominant attacks. 
3.2.2. Literature Review 
The main challenges regarding to securing a CPS toward cyber-attacks contains of 
modeling the cyber-attacks, detecting and developing resilient strategy to maintain the 
functionality of the CPS in the presence of cyber-attacks. In this section, we provide 
literature review over all these three challenges on cyber-attacks in cyber physical systems. 
Modeling cyber-attacks is essential for understanding and analyzing their impacts 
on Cyber-physical Systems (CPSs). There are two main methods for modeling cyber-
attacks: graph-based approaches, and mathematical (Control-oriented) modeling 
approaches.  
Both static and dynamic graph-based techniques such as attack trees and Bayesian 
networks are well-known for attack modeling as they have the advantage of combining user 
friendly, visual features with algorithms that allow analysis of the behavior of the attack in 
the network [46]-[49]. For example, Petri net modeling approaches [49] have been used as 
a more flexible method for modeling the cyber-attacks in large cyber physical 
infrastructures such as smart grids. For such a complex CPS, hierarchical methods for 
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constructing large petri nets from smaller size petri nets have also been proposed [49]. 
Although graph-based approaches have their advantages for engineering applications that 
involve the design of attack detection methods, security analysis and security design in large 
scale CPSs, in industrial applications these models are too complex to be used. Instead of 
graph-based models, mathematical approaches for modeling the attack in SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) have been used for CPSs such as power 
networks and smart grids. In [50] In mathematical approaches, cyber-physical systems are 
typically modeled as time-varying or, the authors considered the large scale CPS as linear 
discrete-time decentralized system, which can be modeled by state space equations and the 
cyber-attacks are modeled as additional exogenous inputs that comprise behavior of 
system’s components [51]-[53]. However, it is not possible to model all cyber-attacks and 
network failures just as an exogenous inputs in the system as they affect the whole CPS 
dynamics in different manners. Several investigation are done on modeling the cyber-
attacks in control frameworks with particular focus on specific attack.   
A wide range of works exists on that explored the data loss problem and physical 
fault diagnosis problem in general networked control systems. Packet dropping phenomena 
provides unreliability and uncertainty into the communication which makes the modeling 
of the network and analysis of data more challenging task [27]-[28], [37]. In general, there 
are two methods to model the packet drop out phenomenon in communication networks: 
(1) Bernoulli model [54],[15] [58]- [64]and (2) Markov Model [7]-[8], [55]-[56]. Bernoulli 
random variable is a simple memory less random variable while, modeling the packet 
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dropping with Markov Model is a more complex and sophisticated methodology which 
captures most of the characteristics of the packet dropping phenomena.  
Cyber-attacks are explored and modeled in various cyber physical systems. DoS 
attack is explore in power system [66] [68], smart grids [69], SCADA [70], and networked 
control systems [66]-[67]. [69] discusses Malicious attacks targeting availability of gird 
network as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which attempt to delay, block or even corrupt 
information transmission in order to make network resources unavailable to communicating 
nodes that need information exchange in the smart grid. In the existing literature on DoS 
modeling, there are two main methodologies to model Denial of Service attack in a CPS 
with control frame work; 1) time delay 2) packet loss [40]-[41].  Indeed, based on the 
network communication protocol and attacker capabilities, DoS attacker can flood too much 
data on the network to make packet congestion on the network and consequently packet will 
loss. However, if the attacker does not make the attack too obvious on the network, it may 
flood the packets randomly on the network and try to increase the service time on the 
communication network [42].   
False  Data  Injection  attack  is  widely  explored  in  cyber physical systems e.g. 
power grid [75]-[76] electricity marker [71],  water  distribution  and  control  systems  [72]-
[73]. The  false  data  injection  attack  in  CPS  refers  to  a  class of  cyber-attacks  in  which  
the  attacker  wishes  to  alter  the integrity of system by compromising a subset of sensors 
and sending inaccurate readings to controller or actuators data from controller. To operate 
the attack, the attacker needs to carefully design  his  input  to  fool  the  controller  since  
abnormal  sensor measurements  will  generally  trigger  an  alarm  [72]. In   the majority of 
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existing literature on modeling false data injection attack in control oriented framework, the 
attack is modeled as an additive sensor/actuator fault on the original data.  Hence, existing  
fault  detection  algorithms,  including  Kalman  filter [71]-[72]  observer  design  [75],  are  
capable  of  detecting  the false data injection attack in the system. However, developing 
new  skills  to  inject  the  cyber-attacks  in  the  cyber  physical system,  attackers  can  
induce  more  intelligent  attacks  which are not diagnosable with fault detection 
methodologies.  
The second challenge in securing the CPS toward cyber-attacks is to provide the 
CPS with an attack detection algorithm. There exist several investigations on modeling and 
detection of cyber-attacks from computer science perspective. The current state of the art 
methods used for cyber-attack detections are utilization of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) and Honeypots. Intrusion detection systems continuously monitor the computer 
system or network and generate alarms to inform the system administrator of suspicious 
events. IDSs are now considered a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of an 
organization [77]-[78]. The objective of intrusion detection is to detect malicious activities, 
and accurately differentiate them from benign activities. Honeypots are needed to 
supplement IDSs in the proposed security scheme because they complement most other 
security technologies by taking a proactive stance. A honeypot is a closely monitored 
computing resource used as a trap to ensnare attackers. As defined by Spitzner, “A honeypot 
is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised [79].” 
The principal objectives of honeypots are to divert attackers away from the critical resources 
and study attacker exploits to create signatures for intrusion detection. The attraction of 
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attackers to honeypots mitigates the threat of malicious attacks and thus helps secure 
valuable information and important services located on the real targets.  
As the last but very crucial challenge of cyber security in CPS, attack resiliency is 
utmost importance to maintain the functional of the CPS in the presence of cyber-attacks. 
However, very few works explore resiliency of systems under attacks and network failures. 
Several groups have looked at control systems with packet loss in their communication 
network, an area that has been recently surveyed in the context of packet-switched networks 
by Hespanha [57].  In particular, there has been considerable effort in analyzing the effect 
of packet loss [58]-[60]. Also, several approaches have been used to compensate the impact 
of packet drop out in networked control systems. For instance [61], uses a predictor to 
modify the controller in the presence of packet drop out. Generally speaking referring to the 
existing literature, to modify the controller in most of the networked control systems and 
cyber physical systems, a good state estimation is required. State estimation over packet 
dropping networks is explored in the existing literature with different methodologies such 
as discrete Kalman filter with intermittent observation [54], [64], optimal estimation 
[59],[61], and using multiple description coding [62]. Although these general results exist 
for networked control systems, very few attempts have been made towards the similar issues 
in connected vehicle applications [64].  In [10],[113] DoS is considered as a class of attack 
strategies primarily intended to affect the timeliness of information exchange. The 
fundamental challenge in DoS attack compensation is to develop a resilient controller to 
keep the performance of the CPS close to the normal while measured sensor information 
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are corrupted by attacker. In [5],[113][112], authors comprehensively survey the concept 
and strategies for building a resilient and integrated cyber–physical system (CPS).  
Furthermore, the DoS attack in the DSRC network degrades the quality of packet 
transmission and induce delay in network service time and consequently in transmission. 
Therefore, to develop a countermeasure on DoS attack in the connected vehicles system, an 
estimation of states over delay induced by the attack on communication network is required. 
The state estimation and fault detection problems over random measurement delays are 
studied for cyber physical systems and the networked control systems in several existing 
literatures [114]-[118].  Different approaches including sliding mode observer design [118], 
robust estimation [119], Continuous Time Hidden Markov Model (CTHMM) [120] and 
discrete time approaches based on state feedback theory and Kalman filter observer design 
[115] are developed and proposed in literatures to estimate the states of the CPS under 
delayed measurements. However, in majority of the existing literatures, the delay induced 
in the measurements due to the communication network is considered to be known. While, 
under the DoS attack this assumption no longer is valid. Consequently, a new approach to 
estimate the state of the CPS under DoS attach which degrade the service time of the 
communication network is required. 
3.2.3. Gaps in Existing Literature 
 Majority of existing literature address the effect of packet dropping in CPS system 
by holding the previous value of lost data which is not necessarily applicable for 
connected vehicles system with changing driving profile.  
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 Several studies try to estimate the lost information using Kalman filter with 
intermittent observation, while this approach is limited for discrete time systems. 
 Very few study on fault estimation over imperfect communication network and in 
all these works the dynamics of fault are known and it changes very slow which is 
a big assumption. 
  Real time fault diagnostics under communication failure was not explored for 
connected vehicles 
   Very few literature exists on actuator fault detection in connected vehicles 
 State estimation under unknown delay are not explored for CPS and connected 
vehicles.  
 Very few researches on probabilistic delay with known distribution, however, there 
is no estimation on delay in observer.  
 Lack of theoretical proof of estimation error convergence 
 In  the  majority  of  existing  literature,  the  false  data  injection  attack  is  modeled  
very  similar  to  additive  fault/failure in  the  control  oriented  frameworks  
Considering general topology (configuration) for cyber physical   systems,   it   is   
very   likely   to   detect   the   injected attack using different methodologies available 
for model-based diagnosis e.g. Kalman filter [28]. However, with all technology 
enhancements, cyber-attacks are become smarter and smarter which make them 
impossible to be detected via traditional fault diagnosis methods. 
 The effects of fake identity (fake node) in cyber physical systems is explored very 
rarely.  
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 There is no work on detection and isolating the fake identity in cyber physical 
system as well as connected vehicles.  
 
3.3. Brief Review of Existing Fault Diagnosis and Observer Design 
Approaches 
In this section, a brief review of the existing fault diagnosis approaches for general 
systems has been provided. In a broad classification, existing approaches can be divided 
into three groups: 1) Model-based approaches, 2) Signal processing based approaches, and 
3) Knowledge-based approaches [34]. Model-based approaches utilize a dynamic model of 
the system in their diagnostic algorithm. Signal processing based approaches use different 
kinds of spectral analysis, time series analysis and statistical methods such as pattern 
recognition, feature extraction etc. In knowledge based approaches, a priori knowledge of 
the system is used along with some reasoning algorithms. In model-based approaches, 
dynamic system model is used to predict the output which is compared to the measured 
signals from the physical system. The difference between the measured data and predicted 
data is used to generate a residual signal which has the idealized property of being zero in 
case of no faults and nonzero in presence of faults. This residual signal is then processed 
further to achieve isolation of the detected faults. 
Model-based designs of fault diagnosis scheme follow the sequential steps: system and fault 
modeling, fault detectability analysis, residual generation, fault isolation and decision 
making. Surveys of different model-based schemes can be found in [35], [83]. Faults 
generally occur in sensors, actuators or in the process. Actuator and sensor faults are 
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generally modeled as additive deviations from the nominal model whereas process faults 
are generally modeled as multiplicative faults which reflect as changes in parameters. 
Coming to the residual generation, there are various existing approaches some of which are 
given below: 
Parity relation approach: In parity space approach [86], the fundamental idea of 
diagnosing a fault is by checking consistency of the mathematical relationships of the 
system using available measurements [35].  
Observer based method: In this method, an observer is used to estimate the states of the 
system using available measurements. Then the estimated states along with the 
measurements are used to generate the residual signals. There are several variations of the 
observer based methods. For example, in unknown input observers [84], the state estimation 
error is decoupled from the unknown input disturbance and noise. In Kalman filter based 
method [85], the innovation sequence is used as residual signals. 
 
Parameter estimation approach: This approach is based on the hypothesis that faults in 
the system change the system parameters Error! Reference source not found.. Therefore, 
ny deviation from the nominal parameter value will be an indication of fault. 
Decision making is another important aspect of the fault diagnosis scheme. After the 
residual is generated, it needs to be evaluated. This is critical because in general the residuals 
do not have the ideal property of being zero in non-faulty condition due to model 




PHYSICAL FAULT DIAGNOSTICS ALGORITHM 
Fault detection, isolation and estimation play important roles in assuring normal 
performance of the CPS. Health monitoring of the CPS including the fault diagnostics 
improves the reliability of the system and prohibits physical malfunctions to degrade the 
whole functionality of the CPS. Indeed, fault detection and estimation provide necessary 
information for the system to make the controller fault tolerant.  In this chapter, a model 
based diagnostics scheme based on sliding mode approach is proposed to detect and isolate 
sensors faults and actuator failures in the platoon of vehicles as an example of CPSs.  
In this part, we consider a platoon of connected vehicles equipped with CACC as 
our case study. Furthermore, two nonlinear observer designs have been presented based-on 
a linear model of each vehicle in the platoon. Both observers are based on sliding mode 
approach based on the measurement on relative distance and velocity of each vehicle. Using 
this algorithm, apart from detecting and isolating faults in relative distance and velocity and 
failure in actuator, it is possible to estimate the fault in both sensors. The convergence of 
error dynamics is proved using Lyapunov theorem. The developed scheme is a new 
contribution to connected vehicles diagnostics research area with the following 
characteristics: 1) Considers essential faults and failures in the system, 2) Theoretical 
verification of the convergence of the state estimation error, 3) Theoretical verification of 




4.1. State Space Modeling  
Each vehicle in the platooning can be modeled as a linear time invariant system as 
it is discussed in Chapter 2. This linear model is written in the form of state space 















]  ,         𝑖 = 𝑆𝑚\{ 1} (7) 
where the control input dynamics changes with state feedback and external inputs coming 
from the vehicle in front through the DSRC network. 











𝑒𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖(𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖(𝑡) (9) 
Remark 1: We consider a homogenous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all vehicles 
in the platoon the same parameters. Also, each vehicle in the platoon, measures relative 
distance with respect to preceding vehicle 𝑑𝑖  and its velocity.  
Remark 2: The estimates of the sensor faults are fed back to the control policy to 
compensate for the effect of these faults. Therefore, the control policy is extended 
to be reconfigurable under such sensor faults.  
Remark 3: Considering measurement on actuator signal of the vehicle, similar 
approach can be applied for actuator fault to detect and estimate the failure in acceleration 
pedal position. To avoid redundancy for now we focus on sensor faults. 
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4.2. Diagnostics Scheme  
The objective of the Sensor Fault Observers is to detect, isolate and estimate faults 
in the on-board sensors, namely the range sensor (which measures 𝑑𝑖) and velocity sensor 
(which measures 𝑣𝑖). It consists of two observers designed based on sliding mode 
methodology which will be discussed shortly.   
In presence of the faults, the measurements from the sensors can be written as:  
𝑑𝑖𝑚 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖 (10) 
𝑣𝑖𝑚 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖 (11) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑚 and 𝑣𝑖𝑚 are the measured variables and, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 and 𝛥𝑣𝑖 represent the sensor faults.  
Remark 4: Note that, we have modelled the sensor faults as additive variables. These 
additive variables represent: 1) bias type of faults which could be constant or time-varying, 
or, 2) sensor gain faults where 𝑑𝑖𝑚 = 𝐾𝑑𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖 with 𝛥𝑑𝑖 = (𝐾 − 1)𝑑𝑖 where 𝐾 
represents the gain fault. 





































          𝑖 = 𝑆𝑚\{ 1 , 2} (12) 
Furthermore, we define 
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?̃?𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖 (13) 
 
Figure 8: Fault diagnostics scheme for connected vehicles 
Remark 5: Note that, 𝑢𝑖 is control input of vehicle 𝑖 which derived by the following 
dynamics: 

















𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜂11sgn(?̃?𝑖 + 𝛥𝑑𝑖)






Note that, under asymptotic condition, ?̃?𝑖 → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ due to its first order stable 
dynamics represented by the time constant 𝜏. Under the condition ?̃?𝑖 → 0, we analyze the 
observer error under two different fault cases. 
The sliding surfaces (which are defined by the terms inside ‘sign’) are 𝑆𝑑 = ?̃?𝑖 +
𝛥𝑑𝑖 and 𝑆𝑣 = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖. The convergence to the first sliding surface can be analyzed using 
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the Lyapunov function candidate 𝑉𝑑 = 0.5𝑆𝑑
2. The derivative of the Lyapunov function 
candidate can be written as: 
?̇?𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑?̇?𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑 (?̇̃?𝑖 + 𝛥?̇?𝑖)  
?̇?𝑑 = 𝑆𝑑(𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜂11sgn(𝑆𝑑) + 𝛥?̇?𝑖)  
⇒ ?̇?𝑑 ≤ |𝑆𝑑|(|𝛥𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥?̇?𝑖| − 𝜂11) (15) 
Therefore, under the assumption of bounded 𝛥𝑣𝑖 and 𝛥?̇?𝑖, and a choice of 
sufficiently high positive gain 𝜂11, we have ?̇?𝑑 < 0 and, hence the sliding surface 𝑆𝑑 = 0 
can be reached. Now, on the sliding surface, we have 𝑆𝑑 = ?̇?𝑑 = 0 [88]. Therefore, based 
on the error dynamics equation (14) and the aforementioned conditions 𝑆𝑑 = ?̇?𝑑 = 0, we 
can write that: 
−𝛥?̇?𝑖 = 𝛥𝑣𝑖 − 𝜃𝑑  
⇒ 𝛥?̇?𝑖 + 𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑 (16) 
where 𝜃𝑑 is the equivalent output error injection which is the filtered version of the 
switching term 𝜂11sgn(𝑆𝑑). For implementation, we can extract 𝜃𝑑 by passing 𝜂11sgn(𝑆𝑑) 
through a low-pass filter of unity gain [88]. 
Similarly, the convergence to the second sliding surface can be analyzed using 𝑉𝑣 =
0.5𝑆𝑣
2. The derivative can be written as: 
?̇?𝑣 = 𝑆𝑣?̇?𝑣 = 𝑆𝑣(?̇̃?𝑖 + 𝛥?̇?𝑖) 
⇒ ?̇?𝑣 = 𝑆𝑣(−𝜂22sgn(𝑆𝑣) + 𝛥?̇?𝑖) 
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⇒ ?̇?𝑣 ≤ |𝑆𝑣|(|𝛥?̇?𝑖| − 𝜂22) (17) 
Therefore, under the assumption of bounded 𝛥?̇?𝑖 and a choice of sufficiently high 
positive gain 𝜂22, we have ?̇?𝑣 < 0 and, hence the sliding surface 𝑆𝑣 = 0 can be reached. 
Now, on the sliding surface, we have 𝑆𝑣 = ?̇?𝑣 = 0 [88]. Therefore, based on the error 
dynamics equation (14) and the aforementioned conditions, we can write that: 
𝛥?̇?𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣 (18) 
where 𝜃𝑣 is the equivalent output error injection which is the filtered version of the 
switching term 𝜂22sgn(𝑆𝑣)[74]. For implementation, we can extract 𝜃𝑣 by passing 
𝜂22sgn(𝑆𝑣) through a low-pass filter of unity gain [88]. 
Assumption 1: we consider only one fault can occur at the same time (either 𝛥𝑣𝑖 or 
𝛥𝑑𝑖) as single fault scenario.  
 Next, we analyze these two fault cases separately: 
Case 1 (𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 0, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 ≠ 0): We have 𝛥?̇?𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑 ,  𝜃𝑣 = 0. Therefore, we can 
construct the following filter to estimate the fault: 
?̇?1𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑  (19) 
where 𝑅1𝑖 is the residual signal (output of the filter (30)) which serves as an estimate 
of the fault 𝛥𝑑𝑖; and the input signal 𝜃𝑑 to the filter (19) is extracted from the switching 
term 𝜂11sgn(𝑆𝑑) as mentioned before. 
Case 2 (𝛥𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝛥𝑑𝑖 = 0): We have  𝛥𝑣𝑖 = 𝜃𝑑 , 𝛥?̇?𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣. Therefore, we can 
construct the following filter to estimate the fault: 
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?̇?2𝑖 = 𝜃𝑣 (20) 
where 𝑅1𝑖 is the residual signal (output of the filter (20)) which serves as an estimate 
of the fault 
iv ; and the input signal 𝜃𝑣 to the filter (20) is extracted from the switching term 
𝜂22sgn(𝑆𝑣) as mentioned before. 
Based on the above analysis, the following fault signature table (Table 3) can be 
constructed. Note that, in case of 
id  fault, we have 𝜃𝑑 ≠ 0, 𝜃𝑣 = 0 and hence 𝑅1𝑖 ≠
0, 𝑅2𝑖 = 0. In case of 𝛥𝑣𝑖 fault, we have 𝜃𝑑 ≠ 0, 𝜃𝑣 ≠ 0 and hence 𝑅1𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑅2𝑖 ≠ 0. This 
signature can be used to detect and isolate the faults. Further, the estimates of the faults 
id  
and  𝛥𝑣𝑖 will be 𝑅1𝑖 and 𝑅2𝑖 respectively. 
Table 2. Fault signature table 
Residual Velocity sensor fault Range sensor fault 
𝑅1𝑖 1 1 
𝑅2𝑖 1 0 
 
4.3. Simulation studies 
This subsection shows the results regarding the performance of Sensor Fault 
Observers. Note that, the estimated value of the fault under fault occurrence is fed back to 
the CACC controller to compensate for the fault effect. To evaluate the performance of the 
proposed diagnostic scheme, two scenarios are considered: 
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Scenario 1: A bias fault of 3 m/s is injected in the velocity sensor of vehicle 3 at 
𝑡 = 450 𝑠. Fig. 9 illustrates the performance of the diagnostic scheme (Sensor Fault 
Observers) under two cases: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC 
with the proposed diagnostic scheme. The first subplot of Fig.9 shows the injected velocity 
sensor fault and the estimated value of this fault by the Sensor Fault Observer. In the second 
subplot of Fig. 9, the relative distance between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is shown. It can be 
seen from Fig. 9 that at least four crashes happen in this specific driving cycle under typical 
CACC. However, applying the CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme, these crashes 
are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed diagnostic scheme is able to 
improve the performance of the connected vehicle system. 
Scenario 2: Similar to the velocity sensor’s fault scenario, a bias fault with 
amplitude of 1.5 𝑚 is injected on range sensor at 𝑡 = 350 𝑠. Fig.10 illustrates the 
performance of the diagnostic scheme (Sensor Fault Observers) under two cases: 1) typical 
CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. The 
first subplot of Fig.10 shows the injected range sensor fault and the estimated value of this 
fault by the Sensor Fault Observer. In the second subplot of Fig. 10, the relative distance 
between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is shown. It can be seen from Fig. 10 that six crashes happen 
in this specific driving cycle under typical CACC. However, applying the CACC with the 
proposed diagnostic scheme, these crashes are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the proposed diagnostic scheme is able to improve the performance of the connected vehicle 
system. 
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Simulation Scenario: A homogenous platoon of five vehicles equipped with CACC 
control strategy is considered. The leader of the platoon follows the scaled and modified 
US06 driving cycle. Vehicle parameters are taken from [30] and [31]. The results are 
illustrated as the follows.   
 
Figure 9: (a) Injected and estimated velocity sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 3 m/s 
and injection time t=450 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) 
under the velocity sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the 
diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. 
 
Figure 10: (a) Injected and estimated range sensor bias fault. Fault amplitude 1.5 m 
and injection time t=350 s. (b) Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) 
under the range sensor fault. Two cases are considered: 1) typical CACC without the 
diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. 
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Remark 6: In case of having measurement on acceleration of the system, we can 
isolate and estimate the actuator fault in the similar way.  
Table 3. Fault signature table II 
Residual Velocity sensor fault Range sensor fault Actuator fault 
𝑅1𝑖 1 1 0 
𝑅2𝑖 1 0 1 
 
Fig.11 shows the results of having fault in relative distance sensor, velocity sensor 
and acceleration pedal sensor. In order to distinguish and estimate failure in actuator we 
need measurement on acceleration pedal position. However, with lack information we still 
can detect this failure too.   
 



































RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD PACKET DROP OUT  
In this section, we explore the problem of network failure simultaneously with on-
board sensor faults for a connected vehicle system. A homogeneous platoon of vehicles 
under Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) strategy is considered as a case study 
of connected vehicles. The aim of this section of the proposed research is to modify the 
existing control strategy by adding a new modifying observer based strategy to estimate 
the lost information due to the packet dropping of the communication network. This will 
make the CACC controller robust to the packet drop out in the network. The proposed 
scheme consists of two components: 1) a Kalman filter to reconstruct the data received via 
unreliable communication network and by adding the fault diagnostics in previous section 
we can have, 2) sensor fault observers based on sliding mode methodology to detect, isolate 
and estimate the sensor faults under packet dropping phenomena. 
5.1. Packet Dropping Modeling  
Analyzing DSRC communication network [23],[110]-[111] with particular attention 
of sending safety messages, we concluded that Bernoulli approach is a proper methodology 
to model the packet dropping in DSRC network [15], [23].  Consider 𝑇𝑠 as the network 
sampling time. The time instant 𝑘 is defined as 𝑘 × 𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1) × 𝑇𝑠 . Between each 
sample time instant, the value of information received through the communication network 
will be held. 
In occurrence of packet drop out in the communication network, the control 
dynamics (5) can be rewritten as the following:  
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(𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘𝑑?̇?𝑖) +
1
ℎ
× 𝜒(𝑘) × 𝑢𝑖−1 (21) 
where 𝜒(𝑘) a variable that represents the packet drop out phenomenon at time instant 𝑘. 
The variable 𝜒 is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable. If the packet is delivered 
correctly, we have 𝜒(𝑘) = 1; otherwise, if packet is lost in the network, we have 𝜒(𝑘) = 0. 
Therefore, we can model packet drop out in the communication network as below:  
𝜒(𝑘) ∈ {0,1} (22) 
where the probability of packet loss is 𝑝(𝜒(𝑘) = 0) = 𝜆 and the probability of successful 
arrival of packet is 𝑝(𝜒(𝑘) = 1) = 1 − 𝜆.  
Remark 7: With the probability of 𝜆, the packet in the network will be lost and the 
vehicle receives no information on the preceding vehicle’s desired acceleration. With the 
probability of 1 − 𝜆, the vehicle will receive correct data from the network 
Assumption 2: Each vehicle in the platoon receives the desired acceleration data of 
the preceding vehicle through DSRC network. 
5.2. Proposed Strategy  
The control policy of CACC strategy for vehicle 𝑖, shown in  (5), depends on two 
crucial sets of information: 1) desired acceleration of the preceding vehicle (𝑢𝑖−1) which is 
received via communication network (Assumption 2) and, 2) velocity of vehicle 𝑖 (𝑣𝑖) and 
the relative distance between vehicle 𝑖 and vehicle 𝑖 − 1 (𝑑𝑖), both of which are measured 
by on-board sensors (Assumption 1). Therefore, data loss due to packet drop out in the 
communication network, and faults in these on-board sensors, will affect the individual 
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vehicle’s behavior and create potentially unsafe situations in the connected vehicle system.  
In this section of proposed research, we propose a diagnostic scheme that improves the 
performance of CACC in presence of these issues. The scheme is shown in Fig. 14. As it 
can be inferred from the schematic, the diagnostic scheme has two components: Filter to 
compensate the packet dropping and fault diagnostics which discussed in the previous 
section  
 
Figure 12: Packet dropping strategy for connected vehicles combined with physical 
fault diagnostics 
Filter 1: The objective of the Filter 1 is to receive the data from communication 
network (DSRC) which is possibly subjected to packet drop and reconstruct the actual data 
(𝑢𝑖−1) with certain accuracy. Filter 1 is essentially a Kalman filter which will be detailed 
shortly.  
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We take the following assumptions which facilitate the filter design. 
Assumption 3: Vehicle 𝑖 receives the following information through the DSRC. 
𝑑𝑖−1: The relative distance of vehicle 𝑖 − 1.  
𝑢𝑖−1: The desire acceleration of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. 
𝑑𝑖−2: The relative distance of vehicle 𝑖 − 2.  
𝑢𝑖−2: The desire acceleration of vehicle 𝑖 − 2.  
Assumption 4: Vehicle 𝑖 measures 𝑣𝑖−1 using its own velocity information and on 
board relative velocity sensor data.  
As mentioned before, the goal of Filter 1 is to reconstruct   𝑢𝑖−1 which is subjected 
to packet drop out.  
Considering the control policy (8) for vehicle 𝑖 − 1, the dynamics of 𝑢𝑖−1 can be 
written as  











𝑒𝑖−1(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖−1(𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖−1(𝑡) (24) 











         +𝐿𝐾(𝑢𝑖−1 − ?̂?𝑖−1) (25) 
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where 
KL  is the Kalman gain and , ?̂?𝑖−1 and ?̂?𝑖−2 are defined as follows: 
?̂?𝑖−1(𝑡) = {
𝑑𝑖−1((𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠)     𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 0
𝑑𝑖−1(𝑘𝑇𝑠)                𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 1
𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1)𝑇𝑠
 (26) 
?̂?𝑖−2(𝑡) = {
𝑢𝑖−2((𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠)     𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 0
𝑢𝑖−2(𝑘𝑇𝑠)                𝑖𝑓 𝜒(𝑘) = 1
𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑘𝑇𝑠 ≤ 𝑡 < (𝑘 + 1)𝑇𝑠
 (27) 
Note that, the variables ?̂?𝑖−1 and ?̂?𝑖−2 are the modified from the data 𝑑𝑖−1 and 𝑢𝑖−2, 
received by vehicle 𝑖. Using the holding strategy, explained in (26)-(27), the error (24) in 
presence of packet dropping will be: 
?̂?𝑖−1(𝑡) = ?̂?𝑖−1(𝑡) − ℎ𝑣𝑖−1(𝑡) (28) 
Assumption 5: The probability of having packet drop outs on consecutive time 
instants 𝑡 =  𝑘𝑇𝑠 and 𝑡 = (𝑘 − 1)𝑇𝑠 is assumed to be negligible. 




?̃?𝑖−1 − 𝐿𝐾?̃?𝑖−1 + 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷 (29) 
?̃?𝑖−1 = 𝑢𝑖−1 − ?̂?𝑖−1 (30) 
where ?̃?𝑖−1 is the estimation error, 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷 represents lumped effect of the 
uncertainties due to packet drop outs, holding strategy (26)-(27) and measurement noise. 
The Kalman gain 𝐿𝐾 is designed following the process detailed in [89]. In the design, the 
uncertain term 𝛥𝑢𝑃𝐷 is considered as a bounded Gaussian process noise which can 
potentially be suppressed by tuning the error covariance matrices. 
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5.3. Simulation Studies 
In this section, we present the simulation studies to verify the effectiveness of the 
scheme.  
Simulation Scenario: A homogenous platoon of five vehicles equipped with CACC 
control strategy is considered. The leader of the platoon follows the scaled and modified 
US06 driving cycle (Fig. 13). Performance of Filter 1 (Data reconstruction under packet 
drop out). This subsection shows the results regarding the performance of Filter 1. It verifies 
the effectiveness of the Filter 1 in reconstructing the actual data which is subjected to packet 
drop outs. Furthermore, it also shows how CACC performance is improved by the addition 
of Filter 1. 
 
Figure 13. Velocity profile of US06 Driving cycle 
The performance of the vehicle 𝑖 in the platoon can be evaluated by considering its 
relative distance 𝑑𝑖 with respect to the preceding vehicle. The CACC strategy attempts to 
 50 
keep the relative distance very small to enhance the traffic throughput. However, failure in 
the communication network may cause degraded performance in CACC and consequently, 
lead to crashes. The relative distance 𝑑𝑖 should be greater than zero to avoid crashes between 
two consecutive vehicles.  
In this simulation study, the relative distance between vehicle 3 and vehicle 2 is used 
to illustrate the scheme. Fig. 14 shows the relative distance in the presence of packet drop 
outs with different probabilities. Note that, the vehicles are not equipped with the proposed 
scheme and only have typical CACC. It can be seen from Fig. 14 that under higher packet 
drop out probabilities, the relative distance between vehicle 2 and 3 becomes negative 
indicating crashes. 
Next, we evaluate the proposed scheme where the vehicles are equipped with 
diagnostic scheme (Filter 1). A network with probability of packet drop out 𝜆 = 0.2 is 
considered. Fig.15 shows the relative distance of vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 under two cases: 
1) typical CACC without the diagnostic scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic 
scheme. It can be seen from Fig. 15 that at least four crashes happen in this specific driving 
cycle under typical CACC. However, applying the CACC with the proposed diagnostic 
scheme, these crashes are avoided. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed 




Figure 14: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3), with different 
probabilities of packet drop out in the communication network. 
 
Figure 15: Relative distance between vehicle 2 and vehicle 3 (𝑑3) with the probability 
of packet drop out 𝜆 = 0.2, under two cases: 1) typical CACC without the diagnostic 
scheme, 2) CACC with the proposed diagnostic scheme. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESILIENT STRATEGIES TOWARD DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK  
In cyber physical systems such as connected vehicles, DoS attack changes the 
average service time of the communication network by imposing illegitimate requests. 
Indeed, the DoS attack induces an additional service time which in turn corresponds to 
additional delay in the transmission network [42]. In the majority of the existing control 
frameworks, the effect of DoS attack has been modelled in two ways: (i) stochastic time 
delay which can be represented by random variables e.g. Bernoulli [41] or probabilistic 
approaches with memory e.g Markov Model [90] ; (ii) constant time delay [42]. In this 
chapter, our main case study is connected vehicle system with Co-operative Adaptive Cruise 
Control (CACC). We develop three different strategies to detect and estimate the effect of 
DoS attack as time-delay. In the first algorithm, we model the DoS attack with stochastic 
time delay in DSRC network. We propose a strategy to estimate the mean value of the delay 
as well as estimating correct value of signal subjected to the delay to modify the CACC 
algorithm correspondingly to maintain the functionality of the platoon. In the second 
strategy, we model DoS attack in DSRC with as constant unknown delay and proposed an 
adaptive observer to estimate the delay. Also, we studied the effects of system uncertainties 
on the DoS estimation algorithm. Finally, in the third algorithm, we considered a general 
CPS system with a saturated DoS attack modeled with constant unknown delay. In this part 
we modeled DoS via a PDE and developed a PDE based observer and an adaptive observer 
to estimate the delay as well as states of the system while the only available measurements 
are delayed.  
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6.1. Strategy Number One  
 
In this section we consider DoS attack in DSRC which degrades the quality of 
packet delivery of the communication network. To countermeasure the DoS attack in the 
platoon system, the conventional CACC algorithm is modified by adding an estimation 
algorithm consisting of two Luenberger observers and a delay estimator. The effectiveness 
of the overall online algorithm scheme is verified via simulation studies. The developed 
scheme is a new contribution to connected vehicles security research area with the following 
characteristics: 1) Considers stochastic delay to model the effect of DoS attack in connected 
vehicles as an example of CPS, 2) Theoretical verification of the convergence of the state 
estimation error, 3) Theoretical verification of delay estimation, and 4) Simple design and 
computationally efficient. 
6.1.1 DoS Attack Modeling  
In this section we simplified the model of the platoon by considering the following 
dynamic controller is considered to achieve the zero regulation error: 
1
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       
 (32) 
where 𝑎𝑖−1 and 𝑣𝑖−1  are the desired acceleration and velocity of the preceding vehicle 
received through DSRC network. The parameters 𝐾𝑝, 𝐾𝑑 > 0 are controller gains designed 
such that (i) the inter-vehicle distance is maintained to 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 and (ii) the 𝑎𝑖 is bounded and 
changes smoothly. As it can be inferred from (32), control signal of vehicle 𝑖 derived from 
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CACC algorithm, 𝑎𝑖, depends on states of vehicle 𝑖 and information received from 
preceding vehicle 𝑖 − 1. 
 Considering (1) and (6), a new augmented state space representation for vehicle 𝑖 
is shown in (33), where, 𝑎𝑖−1 and 𝑣𝑖−1 are two external inputs of the system related to the 
preceding vehicle 𝑖 − 1. 
1 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
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                   
        (33) 
Remark 8: Vehicle 𝑖 receives the absolute velocity, 𝑣𝑖−1 and acceleration 
information of preceding vehicle, 𝑎𝑖−1, through DSRC network. Hence, these signals are 
subjected to network failures and cyber-attacks.  
We can write (33) in the form of general state space representation as (8) considering 
that all states of the system are measured via on-board sensors. 
1( ) ( ) ( )
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where 𝑥𝑖 = [𝑑𝑖, 𝑣𝑖, 𝑎𝑖]
𝑇 ∈ 𝑅3, represents the states of vehicle 𝑖. 𝑢𝑖−1 = [𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1 ]
𝑇 ∈
𝑅2  are external inputs of the system coming from vehicle 𝑖 − 1, and 𝑦𝑖 = [𝑑𝑖, 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖]
𝑇 ∈




Denial of Service (DoS) Attack  
Denial of service attack is a cyber-attack that affects the timeliness of information 
exchange. In this section of proposed research, DoS attack is modeled as a stochastic delay 
on data transmission time in the network. We consider each vehicle updates its data for 
transmission periodically [15]-[16]. Fig.16 shows the packet transmission in ideal network 
and network under DoS attack.  
If there is no attack in the communication network, the packet is delivered with no 
delay. However, in presence of DoS, the attacker increases the service time of the network 
and keeps the network busy. Consequently, vehicle 𝑖 will not receive the new information 
of vehicle 𝑖 − 1, to update its own information. Therefore, vehicle 𝑖 holds the previous data 
of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 [15]-[16],[10] . 
 
 56 
Figure 16: Modeling of Denial of Service attack on signal 𝑎𝑖−1 
Consider 𝑝 as the probability of network being idle to transmit a packet and 𝑞 =
(1 − 𝑝) as the probability of network being busy. The impact of DoS attack can be modeled 
as a stochastic delay as the following: 
𝜏 = 𝑙∆𝑇 < 𝑑 = 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥∆𝑇, 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥} (35) 
where ∆𝑇 is the sample time of updating safety messages in vehicles. Therefore, the 
probability distribution of delay 𝜏 can be defined using Bernoulli random variable 
        𝑃(𝜏 = 0) = 𝑝 
𝑃(𝜏 = ∆𝑇) = 𝑝 × (1 − 𝑝) (36) 
      𝑃(𝜏 = 𝑖 × ∆𝑇) = 𝑝 × (1 − 𝑝)𝑖 
The 𝑝 depends on the DoS attacker capability to keep network busy. Since the DoS 
attack increases the service time [42] and consequently𝑞, in presence of the attack, the 
probability of finding network idle will be reduced.  
In presence of attack the dynamic of the vehicle 𝑖 will change as (37) 
1( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i i
i i
x t Ax t Bu t




where 𝜏 is stochastic delay. 
Assumption 6: The attacker has a limited access to increase the service time of the 
network [42]. Hence, the injected delay in data transmission is bounded with an upper limit 
of 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥 
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6.1.2. Diagnostics Algorithm 
Transmitted data 𝑢𝑖−1, is subjected to DoS attack and hence affected by the 
stochastic delay in the network. The stochastic delay in the receiving data can diminish the 
performance of platoon and cause collisions. Hence, to avoid collisions and enhance the 
performance of platoon, a precise estimation of actual 𝑢𝑖−1 is required. The estimated 𝑢𝑖−1  
can be used in CACC strategy instead of actual 𝑢𝑖−1under DoS attack. This strategy can be 
called modified CACC. To achieve this goal, an estimation algorithm containing three 
components is proposed: (1) Observer I estimates the states of the preceding car in normal 
condition. The output error of the observer I is used as a residual signal to detect the attack. 
(2) Observer II estimates the states of the preceding car with certain accuracy in presence 
DoS attack. These estimates are used in the modified CACC strategy. (3) Delay estimator 
estimates the stochastic delay induced by DoS. The schematic of the online estimation 
scheme is shown in Fig. 17.  
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Figure 17: DoS strategy schematic for connected vehicles to modify CACC 
 
In brief, observer I estimates the states of preceding vehicle in ideal case when there 
is no delay in communication network. In occurrence of DoS, the residual of this observer 
will be non-zero, detects the DoS attack. Therefore, system switches to observer II and delay 
estimator to estimate the states of preceding vehicle accurately even in presence of DoS.  
Real time measurements from vehicle 𝑖 − 1 are 𝑑𝑖−1, 𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1 and inputs for both 
observers are states of vehicle 𝑖 − 2 𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑎𝑖−2 which are received through DSRC under 
stochastic delay.   
Observer I 
Assumption 7: There is no sensor faults in the on-board sensors.  
Similar to (34), dynamics of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 can be written as: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x t Ax t Bu t
y t Cx t
 
  (38) 
where 𝑥 = [𝑑𝑖−1, 𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1]
𝑇 ∈ 𝑅3, represents the states of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. 𝑢 =
[𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑎𝑖−2 ]
𝑇 ∈ 𝑅2 are inputs of the system and 𝑦 = [𝑑𝑖−1, 𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎𝑖−1]
𝑇 ∈ 𝑅3stands for 
measureable outputs of the system. 
A Luenberger observer can be designed as (39) and implemented in vehicle 𝑖: 
 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )mx t Ax t Bu t L y t y t     (39) 
where 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) is the transmitted measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 including relative distance, 
velocity and acceleration. In ideal network with no DoS attack,  
( ) ( )my t Cx t  (40) 
Therefore, error dynamics is derived as: 
1( ) ( ) ( )x t Ax t L Cx t   (41) 
The observer gain, 𝐿1, is selected such that the estimation error ?̃?(𝑡) , with dynamics 
of (41), converges to zero exponentially. To do this, 𝐴 − 𝐿1𝐶 should be negative definite 
matrix. The residual 𝑆1 is defined as 
𝑆1(𝑡) = 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) − 𝑦 ̂(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑥𝑚(𝑡) − 𝑥 ̂(𝑡)) (42) 
In occurrence of DoS attack, since the estimated value is not equal with the 
measurement due to the delay, the residual will be non-zero. This residual is used as an 
indicator of DoS attack in the network. 
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Observer II 
Assumption 8: DSRC is a shared communicating network. Therefore, in presence 
of attack in the network, all exchanging data experience the same delay on the same 
time, 𝜏(𝑡) ∈ {𝜏 | 𝑝(𝜏) < 1 , 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤  𝑑}. 
Assumption 9: The derivative of vehicle acceleration is bounded. 
In presence of DoS attack, since vehicle 𝑖 receives the measurement of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 
through the DSRC network, (38) can be re-written as (43) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x t Ax t Bu t
y t Cx t
  
  (43) 
Considering the mentioned assumptions, the observer dynamics is given as: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )mx t Ax t Bu t L y t y t        (44) 
where ?̂? is the mean value of estimated delay derived from delay estimator explained in the 
next section. 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) is the transmitted measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 .These information are 
transferred from vehicle 𝑖 − 1 through the DSRC network which is subjected to delay 𝜏. 
Therefore, the received measurements of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 in the vehicle 𝑖 have delay of 𝜏 
seconds as it is described in (45).  
( ) ( )my t y t    (45) 
Consequently, the error dynamics can be written as (46) 
 ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x t Ax t LC x t x t        (46) 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x t Ax t LC x t M t     (47) 
With initial condition   
?̃?(𝑡0) = ?̃?0 (48) 
where 𝑀(𝑡) represents the lumped noise and uncertainties caused by error in estimating the 
delay. It is assumed that 𝑀(𝑡)is bounded as: 
|𝑀[𝑡0,𝑡∞]|∞
< 𝐾. ∆ (49) 
The upper bound of the uncertainty can be derived from the driving cycle, maximum 
delay and maximum permitted acceleration. 
Remark 9: The error dynamics (47) is stable and converges to a bounded region 
exponentially, if there exists 𝐿 matrix such that the following Lyapunov-Krasovskii function 
satisfies Proposition 1 [99]. 
 𝑉(𝑡, ?̃?, ?̇̃?) = ?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) + ∫ 𝑒𝑎(𝑠−𝑡)?̃?𝑇(𝑠)𝑆?̃?(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−d






    (50) 
Proposition 1: If there exist 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3 × 3 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 >
0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that along trajectories of (47) the Lyapunov-Krasovskii function (50) 
satisfies the condition (51)  
𝑊 𝑎𝑉=
∆ − 𝑏|𝑀|2 +
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑉 < 0 (51) 
Then the solution of (21) with initial condition of ?̃?(𝑡0) = ?̃?0 satisfies the inequality  
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?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) < 𝑒−𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0)?̃?0







Proof: Applying comparison principle [78], we have  
?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(𝑡, ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃??̇?) < 𝑒





We find  
𝑊 ≤ 2?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̇̃?(𝑡) + 𝑎?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑀𝑇(𝑡)𝑀(𝑡)




− [?̃?𝑇(𝑡 − ℎ)𝑆(?̃?(𝑡 − ℎ)]𝑒−𝑎𝑑 
 (54) 
Applying the standard arguments, we obtain that 
𝑊 ≤ 𝜂𝑇(𝑡)Φη(𝑡) < 0        ∀η(𝑡) ≠ 0 (55) 
where 











∗ 𝜙22 0 𝑃3
𝑇𝐴1 𝑃3
𝑇
∗ ∗ −(𝑆 + 𝑅)𝑒−𝑎𝑑 𝑅𝑒−𝑎𝑑 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −2𝑅𝑒−𝑎𝑑 0





𝛷 < 0    (56) 
is feasible, where 
𝐴1 = −𝐿𝐶  
𝜙11 = 𝐴
𝑇𝑃2 + 𝑃2
𝑇 + 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑆 − Re−𝑎𝑑 (57) 
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𝜙12 = 𝑃 − 𝑃2
𝑇 + 𝐴𝑇𝑃3 (58) 
𝜙22 = −𝑃3 − 𝑃3
𝑇 + 𝑑2𝑅 (59) 
Thus, the following results will be obtained 
Lemma 1. Given 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑑 > 0 , let there exist 3 × 3 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 >
0, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝑆 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that the LMI (56) with notation given in (57)-(59) holds. 
Then the solution of (47) satisfies (50) for all delays  0 ≤ 𝜏(𝑡) ≤  𝑑. Moreover, the ellipsoid 
𝜒∞ = {?̃? ∈ 𝑅
3:  ?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) <  
𝑏
𝑎
𝐾2. ∆2} (60) 
is exponentially attractive with the decay rate a/2 for all |𝑀(𝑡)|2 ≤ 𝐾2. ∆2. 
Delay Estimator  
To estimate states of preceding vehicle, the observer needs estimated average value 
of delay. We define the following residual  
𝑆2(𝑡) = 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) − ?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) = 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝜏) − ?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) (61) 
By discretizing the residual, (61) can be re-written as  
𝑟𝑘 = 𝑆2(𝑘. ∆𝑇) = 𝑦(𝑘. ∆𝑇 − 𝜏) − ?̂?(𝑘. ∆𝑇 − 𝑙∆𝑇) (62) 
𝑟𝑘 = 𝑦(𝑘 − 𝑙) − ?̂?(𝑘 − 𝑙) (63) 
Assume that we have observed the data set 𝑟 = {𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑘 } and we want to 
estimate the average value of stochastic delay. Since in section III, we have proven that the 
estimation error converges to a bounded area, we can assume obtained residual is a 
stationary Gaussian random process [80], with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎  
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 𝑟𝑘~𝒩(𝜇, 𝜎𝑘)   (64) 
Considering (47), we can write:  
 𝑟𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑟𝑘 − 𝐿𝐶𝑟𝑘−𝑙 + 𝑀𝑘 (65) 
𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1) = 𝐴. 𝐸(𝑟𝑘) − 𝐿𝐶. 𝐸(𝑟𝑘−𝑙) + 𝐸(𝑀𝑘) (66) 
where 𝐸(. ) is the expectation operator. Since 𝑀 is assumed to be zero mean white noise, 
the expected value of 𝑟 will be  
𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1) = 𝐸(𝑟𝑘) = 𝜇 = 0     𝑎𝑠     𝑘 → ∞      (67) 
Furthermore,  
𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1
2 ) = 𝐴2𝐸(𝑟𝑘
2) + 𝐿2𝐶2𝐸(𝑟𝑘−𝑙
2 ) + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑟𝑘 . 𝑟𝑘−𝑙) + 𝐸(𝑀𝑘
2)  (68) 
Based on the definition of the variance of a signal, we have 
𝜎𝑘+1
2 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1
2 ) − 𝐸(𝑟𝑘+1)
2 (69) 




2 + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸(𝑟𝑘. 𝑟𝑘−𝑙) + 𝜎𝑀
2  (70) 




2 = 𝜎2           (71) 
Therefore, we can write 
𝜎𝑘
2 = (𝐴2 + 𝐿2𝐶2)𝜎𝑘
2 + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑟(𝑟𝑘. 𝑟𝑘−𝑙) + 𝜎𝑀
2  (72) 
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Since 𝑟 = {𝑟1, 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑘} is Gaussian wide sense stationary signal, the correlation is related 
to delay as 
𝑅𝑟(𝑙) = 𝜎
2𝑒−|𝑙|/∆𝑇 (73) 
Substituting (45) and (47) in (46), we have:  
𝜎2 = (𝐴2 + 𝐿2𝐶2)𝜎2 + 2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎2𝑒−|𝑙|/∆𝑇 + 𝜎𝑀
2  (74) 










𝑙 = |𝑙| = ∆𝑇. 𝐿𝑛 (
2𝐴𝐿𝐶𝜎2
(𝐼−𝐴2−𝐿2𝐶2)𝜎2−𝜎𝑀
2 ) (77) 
Using the probability distribution of 𝑟 and measuring the variance of residual, we can 
measure the delay 𝑙 and have an approximation of total delay 𝜏 = ∆𝑇. 𝑙.  
Therefore, we can write  
?̂? = ∆𝑇. 𝑙 (78) 
Every sample time, using the updated 𝜏 and updated estimation and new 
observation, all calculation will be updated. Note that, better estimation of the delay, reduces 
the uncertainties boundary in (47) and (49). 
6.1.3. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we simulate a homogenous platoon of 5 vehicles equipped with 
CACC strategy. Vehicle 1 as the leader of platoon, follows UDDS driving cycle. 
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Considering ℎ = 0.3 𝑠 and tuning the controller to track the desire relative distance, the 









],   
𝐶 = 𝐼3×3  
We consider vehicle 3 as a case study to demonstrate the results. In vehicle 3, the 
external input signal is 𝑢2 = [𝑣2, 𝑎2] 
𝑇coming from vehicle 2 through the DSRC. The 





]  , 𝑎 = 1 , 𝑏 = 2 
These values are selected such that the LMI in (24) is satisfied and matrix Φ is 



























To simulate DoS attack in the platoon, a Bernoulli random variable with probability 
of success 𝑝 = 0.5 is considered. The corresponding delay in injected as the DoS attack into 
the communication network at 𝑡 = 300 𝑠𝑒𝑐 and remains in the system. In occurrence of 
DoS attack, the states of vehicle 2 consisting 𝑣2 and 𝑎2 are estimated by proposed observer 
II and delay estimator. The modified CACC strategy, uses the estimated ?̂?2 = [𝑣2, ?̂?2] 
instead of actual one. Hence, the performance of platoon in presence of DoS enhances. 
Fig.18 shows the states of vehicle 3, relative distance (𝑑3) velocity (𝑣3) and acceleration 
(𝑎3) in different scenarios.  Solid blue curves represent the states of vehicle 3 in indeal case 
with no DoS attack in the communication network. Solid red curves show states of vehicle 
3 in occurrence of the DoS attack injected at 𝑡 = 300 𝑠𝑒𝑐  when the normal CACC is 
applied as control strategy. Finally, the green curves represent the states of vehicle 3 in 
presence of DoS attack when modified CACC control strategy uses the estimated states of 
vehicle 2.  
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Figure 18: States of vehicle 3, 𝑑3, 𝑣3 and 𝑎3 in ideal network (blue), under attack with 
normal CACC (red), with modified CACC which uses estimated signals of vehicle 2 
?̂?2 = [𝑣2, ?̂?2] 
 
Figure 19: States of vehicle 3, zoomed results for 𝑡 = [290 350], before occurrence of 
DoS and after that. 
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To visualize the results better, Fig. 19 depicts the zoomed area of results for the 
time interval𝑡 = [ 290, 350]. As it can be inferred from Fig.18 and Fig.19, in presence of 
DoS attack, due to the delay in the receiving data, the relative distance in several points is 
less than critical safety distance. However, using correct estimation, platoon has better 
performance which is close to ideal case 
 
6.2. Strategy Number Two 
The main contribution of the present section is a control-oriented  diagnostic  
framework  for  connected  vehicle systems  that  is  capable  of  (i)  detecting  the  occurrence  
of DoS  attack  and,  (ii)  providing  an  estimate  of  the  effect  of the  attack.  Note  that,  
the  estimate  of  the  effect  of  the  attack can  be  extremely  useful  for  designing  secure  
control  system for  the  vehicles.  In  this  section  we  model  the  DoS  attack  by a  time  
delay  in  information  processing  by  the  network.  The DoS detection scheme consists of 
a set of observers designed by combining adaptive estimation and sliding mode theory. 
Essentially,  the  goal  of  the  scheme  is  to  track  the  delay  in the  information  processing  
by  the  DSRC.  When the delay exceeds a pre-defined threshold, a DoS occurrence is 
detected. The pre-defined threshold is computed offline considering the modeling, 
measurement and communication uncertainties. The scheme also estimates the delay 
providing an estimate of the effect of DoS. This estimated delay can be used for updating 




6.2.1. DoS Attack Modeling  
In this section, we assume the DoS attacker focuses on the endpoint (the following 
vehicle) and flood the communication network with excessive amount of packets; therefore, 
the authorized user (vehicle 𝑖) cannot access to the DSRC network on time and the 
acceleration data of the leading vehicle 𝑖 − 1 will be delivered to the follower with a  delay. 
Since the capability of the attacker is not known, in this section, the delay induced by DoS 
attack is modeled as unknown constant delay. Considering Remark 1, dynamics of vehicle 
𝑖 in (\ref{vehicle}) under DoS attack can be written as  
1 1
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        (79) 
where vehicle 𝑖 receives the acceleration information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 with unknown delay 
induced by DoS attack, 𝜏.  
Assumption 10: The attacker has a limited capability to keep the network busy. Hence, the 
effect of DoS attack as the unknown delay has an upper bound corresponding to the 
maximum capability of the attacker. i.e. 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥]. 
Assumption 11: We consider a homogeneous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all vehicles 
in the platoon have the same parameters e.g. mass, inertia, rolling resistance coefficient.  
Assumption 12: Each vehicle in the platoon measures relative distance with respect to 
preceding vehicle 𝑑𝑖 and following vehicle 𝑑𝑖+1. 
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Remark 10: Vehicle 𝑖 measures the relative velocity via radar and hence can compute the 
absolute velocity 𝑣𝑖−1 of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Vehicle 𝑖 also receives acceleration 𝑎i−1  
information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 via DSRC network which is subjected to network failures and 
cyber-attacks.  
6.2.2. Real-time Detection and Estimation Scheme for DoS Attack 
With the formulation discussed in the previous section, the diagnostic problem is to detect 
when the delay parameter 𝜏 is non-zero and if so, estimate the value of 𝜏. The detection 
and estimation scheme for DoS attack is presented in Fig. 20.  
Remark 11: The DoS detection module is implemented in vehicle 𝑖 − 1. As 
mentioned in the previous section, vehicle 𝑖 − 1 has access to the following information: (i) 
𝑑𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑣𝑖(𝑡) measured by rear radar of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 and, (ii) 𝑎𝑖(𝑡) directly measured in 
vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Note that, these measurements are not affected by the occurrence of the DoS 
attack.  
 
Figure 20. DoS attack detection and estimation scheme. 
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The proposed scheme consists of a model-based observer, denoted by Vehicle i 
Observer. Based on the available measurements and the model (79), Vehicle i Observer 
detects the occurrence and estimates size of the delay𝜏. Before detailing the design of the 
Vehicle i Observer, we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 13: The signal 𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡) is at least two times differentiable with respect 
to time. Furthermore, the derivative is bounded by some finite value, i.e. |?̇?𝑖−1(𝑡)| <
?̅?𝑑, ∀𝑡 > 0 
Assumption 14: Using Taylor's series expansion [91], the delayed signal 
𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡 − 𝜏)can be written as 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) . .i i ia t a t a t H OT         (80) 
where 𝐻.𝑂. 𝑇 represents the higher order terms of the Taylor's series expansion. We 
assume that $H.O.T$ is negligible and hence 𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡 − 𝜏) ≈  𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡) − 𝜏?̇?𝑖−1(𝑡). 
DoS Attack Detection 
Applying Assumption 14, the system dynamics (79) can be written as: 
1( ) ( ) ( )i i id t v t v t    (81) 
( ) ( )i iv t a t   (82) 
1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ,( ) ( ) ( )p d di i p i p i i i i
k k k
a t d t k v t k a t v t a t a t
h h h h h
         
  (83) 
We choose the following structure for Vehicle i Observer. 
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ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
p d d
i i p i p i
i i a i
k k k
a t d t k v t k t v t
h h h h






     
   
  (85) 
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )b i i
L
t a t t a t
h
   
  (86) 
where 𝑣𝑖(𝑡), and ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) are the estimated relative velocity and acceleration, respectively; 
?̂?(𝑡) is the estimated delay; 𝐿𝑣 , 𝐿𝑎, 𝐿𝑏 are the constant observer gains to be designed; 
𝑣𝑖−1(𝑡) and 𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡)are measured via on-board sensors in Vehicle i-1; 𝑑𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑣𝑖(𝑡)are 
measured by Vehicle i-1 using radar; 𝜂 is a filtered version of the signal 𝐿𝑣𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣𝑖(𝑡) −
𝑣𝑖(𝑡). Next, we state the main result of the proposed approach.  
Main Result: Consider the system model described in (81)-(83), and the observer 
structure (84)-(86). If the assumptions 13-14 hold true, then the estimated value of DoS 
attack, ?̂?(𝑡), converges to its true value 𝜏, as 𝑡 → ∞, given the the observer gains satisfy the 
following conditions:  
 ,  0a bL L    (87) 
( ) 0, 0v iL a t t      (88) 
Proof: Subtracting (84)-(85) from (82)-(83), we can write the error dynamics of the 
observer as: 




ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,( ) ( ) ( )di p i p i i a i
k
a t k v t k a t t a t t L t a t
h h h
          
  (90) 
where 𝐿𝑣𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑣𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑣𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖(𝑡) − ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) and ?̃?(𝑡) = 𝜏(𝑡) − ?̂?(𝑡)  are the 





2(𝑡). The derivative of the Lyapunov function candidate can 
be written as: 
. .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )iv i i i v i iV t v t v t v t a t L v t sgn v t     (91) 
Applying the inequality 𝐴𝐵 ≤ |𝐴||𝐵| on the first term of the right hand side of (91), 
we can write  
.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )v i i v i i i vV t v t a t L v t v t a t L      (92) 
If the observer gain is such that 𝐿𝑣 > |𝑎𝑖(𝑡)| > 0, ∀𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑉𝑣
.
(𝑡) ≤ 0, and 
hence we can write: 
.
( ) ( )v vV t V t    (93) 
where 𝛼 = min
𝑡≥0
√2(𝐿𝑣 − |𝑎𝑖(𝑡)|) ≥ 0. The solution of the differential inequality 





. Therefore, we can conclude that 
𝑉𝑣(𝑡) → 0  after some finite time 𝑡𝑓 <
2
𝛼
√𝑉𝑣(0). After 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓, we have 𝑉𝑣(𝑡) = 0, 𝑉𝑣
.
(𝑡) =
0, hence ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) = 0, ?̇̃?𝑖(𝑡) = 0  [88]. Therefore, after 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑓 we can re-write (89) as 
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i ia t t t a t       (94) 
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where 𝜂 is called equivalent output error injection to maintain the sliding motion [88]. In 
practice, 𝜂  can be extracted by passing the switching signal 𝐿𝑣𝑠𝑔𝑛(?̃?𝑖(𝑡)) through a low-
pass filter with unity steady-state gain. Next, we analyze the error dynamics (90) using the 







?̃?2(𝑡) where 𝐾 > 0. The derivative of 
the Lyapunov function candidate can be written as: 
.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a i iV t a t a t K t t     (95) 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ) ( )a i i a i iV t a t a t t L a t a t K t t
h
     
  (96) 




ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ) ( )a i i a i iV t a t a t t L a t a t K t t
h
     
  (97) 
Applying the update law (86) and choosing 𝐾 =
1
𝐿𝑏
, (97) becomes 
.
2( ) ( ) 0a a iV t L a t     (98) 
This concludes the decaying behavior of 𝑉𝑎(𝑡)that is 𝑉𝑎(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(0). So, starting 








?̃?2(𝑡), we conclude that ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) and ?̃?(𝑡)are bounded as well.  
Convergence of ?̃?𝑖: In this part, we prove ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) → 0  as 𝑡 → ∞. We derive the second 
derivative of Lyapunov candidate 𝑉𝑎(𝑡) with respect to time as  
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( ) 2 ( ) ( )a a i iV t L a t a t    (99) 




( ) ( ) ( )ii a ia t a t L a t
h
  
  (100) 
we have 
2 2
1( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
a
a i i a i
L
V t a t a t L a t
h
 
  (101) 
As it mentioned earlier, ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) and ?̃?  are bounded. Furthermore, referring to 
Assumption 13, ?̇?𝑖−1 is bounded. Hence, (101)shows the boundedness of ?̈?𝑎(𝑡) < ∞ which 
equivalently verifies that ?̇?𝑎(𝑡) is uniformly continuous. Now, applying Barbalat's lemma 
[92] on ?̇?𝑎(𝑡) combined with the fact that 𝑉𝑎(𝑡) is bounded, we have ?̇?𝑎(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. 
Consequently, ?̇?𝑎(𝑡) = −2𝐿𝑎?̃?𝑖
2(𝑡) → 0. indicates that ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) → 0as 𝑡 → ∞.  
Convergence of ?̃? 
 In this part, we prove ?̃? → 0as 𝑡 → ∞. We know that  
0
( ) ( ) (0) (0)i i i ia t dx a a a

         (102) 
Furthermore, ?̇?𝑎(𝑡), ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) and ?̃? are uniformly continuous. Also, referring to 
Assumption 13, second derivative of 𝑎𝑖−1(𝑡) exists and is finite which equivalently imply 
that, ?̇?𝑖−1(𝑡) is uniformly continuous. Hence, using (100) we conclude ?̇̃?𝑖(𝑡)is uniformly 
continuous. Therefore, by applying Barbalat's lemma [92], and considering the fact that 
?̇̃?𝑖(𝑡)is bounded, we can conclude ?̇̃?𝑖(𝑡) → 0as 𝑡 → ∞. Next, considering (78), where 
?̇̃?𝑖(𝑡) → 0 and ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞, it is clear that ?̃? → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. 
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Remark 12: The estimate of the delay parameter, ?̂?, will be used to detect the 
occurrence of the DoS attack. Ideally, a DoS occurrence will be detected when ?̂? > 0. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of ?̂? will serve as an estimate of the effect of DoS. 
The effects of uncertainties have not been considered in the design of the detection 
observers. However, possible sources of uncertainty that affect the diagnostic scheme are: 
1) unmodeled dynamics, 2) Radar measurement noise [93]-[94] 3) inherent communication 
delay in a practical DSRC network, 4) Driver behavior which affects CACC gains e.g. 𝑘𝑝 
and 𝑘𝑑 [95]. The presence of these uncertainties prohibits ?̂? from having the idealized 
property of being zero even in the absence of any DoS attack. One of the possible ways to 
deal with this is to use nonzero threshold set based on a realistic DSRC network behavior. 
The detection logic will be: DoS attack is detected when ?̂? > 𝛿 and no DoS when ?̂? ≤
𝛿where 𝛿 is the threshold. The effect of the uncertainties on ?̂? will be suppressed below 
this threshold value.  
Below are the guidelines for selection of constant threshold values for the evaluation of the 
residual:  
Step 1: Collect ?̂? data under no DoS attack in normal DSRC network conditions from 
Monte-Carlo simulations or experimental studies.  
Step 2: Plot the probability distribution of ?̂?. An example probability distribution is 
shown in Fig. 21.In practice, this probability distribution will depend on uncertainties in the 
experimental data or of the Monte-Carlo study.  
 Step 3: Select a maximum allowable probability of false alarms. 
 78 
Step 4: It can be seen from Fig. 21 that the probability of the false alarms can be 
computed by the following equation:  
0 ( ) ,FAP p x dx


    (103) 
where 𝑃𝐹𝐴 is the probability of DoS false alarm, 𝛿 is the selected threshold for DoS attack 
and 𝑝0(𝑥) is the ?̂? probability distribution under no DoS attack in the DSRC network. The 
goal here is to select 𝛿 which will yield an acceptable 𝑃𝐹𝐴. 
 
Figure 21. Residual probability distribution under no attack condition 
 
6.2.3. Simulation Studies 
In this section, we present simulation studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed scheme. In this simulation setup, we consider a platoon of four identical vehicles 
equipped with CACC system. The vehicles in the platoon exchange their safety related 
messages including acceleration information through DSRC network. Furthermore, we 
assume that the platoon follows a dynamic velocity profile, namely the US06 driving cycle 
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shown in Fig. 13. In simulation, we repeat this driving cycle 13 times to create velocity 
trajectory followed by the leader vehicle. Model and control parameters of the platoon and 
CACC system are chosen as ℎ =  0.3 𝑠, 𝑘𝑝 = 0.7, and 𝑘𝑑 = 1 [30]-[31]. To illustrate the 
results of the proposed algorithm, we particularly focus on the performance of the Vehicle 
3 in the platoon. Since we focus on Vehicle 3, the presented algorithm containing two 
observers implemented in Vehicle 2, as noted in Remark 12. Next, we present the following 
case studies.  
Case 1: In this case study, we motivate the need for the DoS attack detection 
algorithm by illustrating the adverse effects of the attacks on the platoon. In Fig. 22, we 
show the relative distance (𝑑3), velocity (𝑣3) and acceleration (𝑎3) of Vehicle 3 in the 
presence of the DoS attacks. To simulate the the effect of the DoS attacks, different 
magnitudes of delays are injected to the DSRC network. In the ideal case when there is no 
delay in DSRC network, i.e.𝜏 = 0 𝑠, the relative distance of Vehicle 3 is maintained above 
the minimum safety distance 𝑑𝑠 for all time. However, the performance of Vehicle 3 
degrades when we increase the magnitude of the DoS attacks, i.e. 𝜏 > 0.2 𝑠. In these 
scenarios, the minimum distance requirement is violated as shown in the top plot in Fig.22. 
These violations represent crash scenarios in a platoon of self-driving vehicles. From this 
case study, we can conclude that DoS attack might lead to potentially dangerous situations. 
Hence, the need for DoS detection is evident for secure control of connected vehicles.  
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Figure 22: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS Attacks in DSRC 
Network 
 
 Case 2: In the second case study, we consider a more realistic scenario in the 
simulation. Ideal communication does not exist in practical applications, especially for 
DSRC [23]. Hence, we add a random non-zero mean delay with Gaussian distribution to 
the communication network. This random delay represents the inherent uncertainties in 
DSRC communication. The mean value and standard deviation of the network induced 
delay are chosen as 𝜇𝑁 = 0.1 𝑠 and 𝜎𝑁 = 0.03 𝑠, respectively. Next, we show the 
performance of the scheme in presence of this inherent communication delay. Note that, 
there is no DoS attack in this case study. The relative distance (𝑑3), velocity (𝑣3) and 
acceleration (𝑎3) corresponding to Vehicle 3 are shown in Fig. 23 under this scenario. We 
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can see in the top plot of Fig. 23 that the CACC performs reasonably as the inter-vehicle 
distance between two cars is more than the assigned safety distance, 𝑑𝑠 = 0.5 𝑚. Regarding 
the detection scheme, observers are initialized with incorrect values of ?̂?3(0) = 0 and 
?̂?(0) = 0, respectively. The estimated value of acceleration in Vehicle 3 is shown in the first 
plot of Fig. 24. As can be seen in Fig. 24, the estimated value (?̂?3) converges to its actual 
value (𝑎3). The estimation error is given in the bottom plot in Fig. 24. Furthermore, the 
detection algorithm is able to estimate the mean value of this network-induced delay as 
shown in the first plot of Fig. 25. We quantify the estimation performance in terms of 
convergence time. Referring to Fig. 25, the convergence time is within 100 seconds for the 
delay estimation. Importantly, the estimated delay is within the predefined threshold (𝛿) 
indicating no occurrence of DoS.  
 
Figure 23: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under normal DSRC Network 
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Figure 24: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3denotes actual value 
and 𝜂 denotes estimated value. 
 
Figure 25: Network induced delay and estimation of the delay in normal DSRC 
Network 
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Case 3: In this case, we test the effectiveness of the proposed approach under DoS 
attack. To emulate the DoS attack, a delay of 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑠 is injected at 𝑡 =  3000 𝑠 to the 
communication network apart from the a aforementioned network induced delay. The 
induced delay takes certain time to reach a constant steady-state value as shown in Fig. 28. 
This is due to the assumption that it takes certain time for the attacker to jam the network. 
Fig. 26 shows the relative distance 𝑑3, velocity 𝑣3 and acceleration 𝑎3 of Vehicle 3 in the 
presence of this DoS attack. Observers are initialized with incorrect values of ?̂?3(0) = 0 
and ?̂?(0) = 0, respectively. The estimated acceleration of vehicle 3, ?̂?3 is shown in the top 
plot of Fig. 27 along with the actual value of 𝑎3. The acceleration estimation error given by 
bottom plot of Fig. 27. These two figures illustrate that the estimated value ?̂?3(𝑡) converges 
to the actual value in finite time. Furthermore, the algorithm is also able to detect and 
estimate the DoS attack. The top plot in Fig. 28 shows the delay estimation performance. 
The DoS estimation error is given in the bottom plot of Fig. 28. The attack is detected when 
the estimated delay (?̂?) crossed the threshold (𝛿) after the attack occurrence. The estimate 
?̂? closely tracks the true delay 𝜏. The steady-state delay estimation error lies within less than 
10% of the original value.  
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Figure 26: Performance of the Vehicle 3 in the platoon under DoS attack in DSRC 
network 
     
 
Figure 27: Acceleration estimation in Vehicle 3. The variable 𝑎3denotes actual value 
and 𝜂 denotes estimated value. 
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Figure 28: Delay estimation under DoS attack 
 
Next, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under several form of 
uncertainties. In all these following scenarios, a non-zero mean Gaussian delay with the 
mean value of 𝜇𝑁 = 0.1 𝑠 and standard deviation of 𝜎𝑁 = 0. 03 𝑠 is considered as the 
network induced delay. Furthermore, a constant delay of 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑠 is added to represent the 
attack at  𝑡 =  3000𝑠.  
 
Case 4: In this case study we demonstrate the robustness of DoS detection algorithm 
to the uncertainty in the proportional gain 𝑘𝑝. Note that the observers are designed based on 
the nominal parameter value whereas the actual vehicle parameter is different than the 
nominal value. The nature of the uncertainty is an additive constant offset added to the 
nominal value of parameter 𝑘𝑝. We inject 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% uncertainties to the 𝑘𝑝, 
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i.e. 𝑘𝑝 = 𝑘𝑝0 + ∆𝑘𝑝  where 𝑘𝑝0 is the nominal value and ∆𝑘𝑝 is the injected uncertainty. 
Figure.29 presents the estimated values of the delay under these uncertainties. As can be 
seen from Fig. 29, the proposed scheme can detect the DoS attack in less than 70 seconds 
after the attack injection even in the presence of uncertainties. However, delay estimation 
suffers from these uncertainties leading to 15% or more error.  
 
 
Figure 29: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the 
parameter 𝑘𝑝. The scenario is based on Case 4. 
     
Case 5: In this scenario, the robustness of the proposed scheme is evaluated under 
uncertain 𝑘𝑑. To study the effect of uncertainties, we inject 5%, 10%, 15% , and 20% 
uncertainties to the nominal value of 𝑘𝑑 in the model. Same as before, the observers are 
designed based on the nominal parameter value. Figure. 30 shows the delay estimation for 
different levels of uncertainties in 𝑘𝑑. As can be inferred from Fig. 30, the DoS detection 
algorithm can detect the DoS attack despite the uncertainties. However, the presence of 
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uncertainties affects the accurate delay estimation. For example, there is 15% estimation 
error under 20% uncertain 𝑘𝑑.  
 
Figure 30: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in the 
parameter𝑘𝑑. The scenario is based on Case 5. 
 
Case 6: In this case study the effects of measurement noise is discussed. A zero 
mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation of 𝜎 is added to the velocity measurement.  
To illustrate the robustness of the proposed scheme under measurement uncertainty in 𝑉𝑖, 
different levels of noises as   𝜎 =  0.07, 0.1, 0.14, 0.21 are added to the velocity 
measurement. Figure 31 shows the delay estimation for different levels of measurement 
noises in 𝑉𝑖. It can be seen in Fig. 31 that the DoS detection algorithm detects the DoS attack 
in all cases. However, the presence of uncertainties affects the accurate delay estimation. 




Figure 31: Delay estimation performance under different levels of uncertainties in 
𝑉𝑖 measurement. The scenario is based on Case 6. 
 
6.3. Strategy Number Three 
 
In this section, we consider a distributed cyber physical system with a shared 
communication network where the local controller of a sub-system receives measurements 
with delay. The amount of lumped delay produced by sensor measurements and network 
communication, is unknown. A new observer-based algorithm is proposed to estimate the 
states of the system at the time 𝑡 when only delayed measurements are available. The main 
contribution of this section of the thesis is the idea of using new observer-based algorithm 
to estimate an unknown delay and states of a system in the presence of delayed 
measurements. This study under the condition of unknown delay in the measurements has 
not been explored in the existing literatures. To address this research gap, a new approach 
consisting of two observers is presented. i) a PDE-based observer to estimate the unknown 
delay with adaptive estimation ; and ii) an ODE-based observer to predict the states of the 
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system using the information from the former observer. Theoretical contributions of this 
section are devoted to mathematically proving the convergence of estimation error in both 
ODE delayed observer as well as PDE observer.   




 , 𝑧𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) =
𝜕𝑧(𝑥,𝑡)
𝜕𝑥




6.3.1. Problem Statement  
Consider a distributed cyber physical system with a shared communication network 
shown in Fig.32. Each plant as a subsystem of the CPS transfers sensor measurements to 
the local controller using the communication network.  
 
Figure 32. A distributed CPS with a shared network. 
For simplicity, we mainly focus on one subsystem of the CPS as it is depicted in 
Fig.33. In this section, we consider a lumped constant unknown delay, 𝐷, between the actual 
measureable data and the data the controller receives. The system dynamics can be modelled 
as: 
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?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑋(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) (104) 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷) (105) 
 
 
Figure 33.  A schematic of a sub-plant of the distributed CPS. 
Where ∈ ℝ𝑛 , 𝑌 ∈ ℝ𝑚 and 𝑈 ∈ ℝ𝑝  are states, output and input of the system 
respectively. 𝐴: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑛, 𝐵: ℝ𝑛 × ℝ𝑝 , 𝐶: ℝ𝑚 × ℝ𝑛 are well defined matrices and all 
eigenvalues of 𝐴 have negative real part. 𝐷 ∈ ℝ+ , 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 is a nonzero lumped 
unknown constant delay where the upper and lower bounds of the delay are known. 
Dynamics of the delay is modelled with a transport PDE which allows a linear 
parameterization in the unknown delay [98]. 
𝐷𝑧𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡)      , 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] (106) 
𝑧(0, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷) (107)  
𝑧(1, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡) (108) 
NOTE: Measured value in the plant at time t is 𝐶𝑋(𝑡), but the available 
measurement in the controller is 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷).  
Where 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) is the state of communication network in the transport PDE model 
and only 𝑧(0, 𝑡) is available as the measurement in the controller.  
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𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 + 𝐷(𝑥 − 1)) (109) 
Therefore, we can write 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) as the solution of the PDE (106)-(108) and Ordinary 
Differential Equation (ODE) system (1)-(2) as follows: 





Where, 𝑋0 = 𝑋(𝑡 = 𝑡0) 
Considering (6), the solution of the PDE (3)-(5) is derived as: 




The goal of this section is to design a state estimation to predict (𝑡) , while only the 
delayed measurements, 𝐶𝑋(𝑡 − 𝐷), is available.  
6.3.2. Estimation Algorithm  
In this section, we will discuss the proposed scheme in detail. As mentioned before, 
the main objective of this scheme is to estimate the unknown delay, 𝐷, and predict the states 
of the system 𝑋(𝑡). From the schematic depicted in Fig. 24, it can be inferred that the 
algorithm consists of two observers working in cascade manner as follows. 
Observer I:  This observer is an adaptive observer based on the PDE dynamics of 
the unknown delay. Using the available measurements affected by the delay, the observer 
estimates the unknown delay and updates the adaptation law.  The estimated delay is fed 
into the Observer II to predict 𝑋(𝑡).  
Observer II: The second observer is an ODE based linear observer which is 
designed using the estimated delay and available system inputs and outputs. 
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The details of the design of these individual elements are discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
Remark 14: The presented scheme is designed and implemented in the local 
controller. Hence, observers only use available information in the controller.  
 
Figure 34.  The schematic of the proposed algorithm. 
Observer I 
We consider the observer dynamics as the following [96]-[97] 
?̇̂?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̂?(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿1?̂?(𝑌(𝑡) − ?̂?(𝑡))  (111) 
?̂?(𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) (112) 
Where, ?̂?(𝑡) is the estimated value of unknown delay, ?̂? (𝑡) and ?̂?(𝑡)  are the 
estimations of 𝑋(𝑡) and 𝑌(𝑡) respectively. Similar to the original system, in the observer 
design, the estimated delay is modelled with a transport PDE: 
?̂?(0, 𝑡) = ?̂?(𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) (113) 
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?̂?(1, 𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡) (114) 
where  





Using (12), dynamic of the estimated delay is given as   
?̂??̂?𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) = ?̂?𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + ?̇̂?(𝑥 − 1)) + ?̂?𝐿1?̃?(0, 𝑡)    (116) 
Next, we implement (116) in (111)-(112) to re-write the observer dynamics  
?̇̂?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̂?(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿1(?̃?(0, 𝑡)) (117) 
?̂??̂?𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) = ?̂?𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + ?̇̂?(𝑥 − 1)) + ?̂?𝐿1?̃?(0, 𝑡)    (118) 
?̂?(0, 𝑡) = ?̂?(𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?)    ,    ?̂?(1, 𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡)  (119) 
where, ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) − ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑡). Defining ?̃? = 𝐷 − ?̂? as the delay estimation 
error, ?̂? in the left side of (118) can be substituted by ?̂? = 𝐷 − ?̃? . Further, (118) as the 
observer dynamic can be re-written as 
𝐷?̂?𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) = ?̃??̂?𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) + ?̂?𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) (1 + ?̇̂?(𝑥 − 1)) + ?̂?𝐿1?̃?(0, 𝑡) (120) 
The standard projector operator is given by 
?̇̂? = 𝛾𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗 {𝜏(𝑡)} = {
0,     ?̂? = 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏 < 0
0,     ?̂? = 𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏 > 0
𝜏(𝑡) ,                 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒        
 (121) 





?̃?(0, 𝑡)?̂?𝑥(0, 𝑡) (122) 
And 𝛾 > 0 is the adaptation gain which can be selected as a small enough value. 
The estimation error dynamics are derived by subtracting (120) from (106),  
?̇̃?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̃?(𝑡) − 𝐿1?̃?(0, 𝑡) (123) 






(𝑥 − 1)?̂?𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) − 𝐿1𝐷?̃?(0, 𝑡) (124) 
?̃?(1, 𝑡) = 𝐶?̃?(𝑡) 
?̇̃?(𝑡) = −?̇̂?(𝑡) (125) 
Theorem 1: Consider a system described with (104)-(106) and unknown delay 
dynamics as (107)-(108). For the observer designed as (111)-(114) and adaptive delay 
estimator of (121), the output estimation error ?̃?(0, 𝑡) and delay estimation error, ?̃?, will 
converge to a bounded area as 𝑡 →  ∞, if the observer gain 𝐿1 is selected large enough to 





Proof: To analyse the estimation error dynamics, we consider function (126) as 
Lyapunov candidate 
𝑊(𝑡) =  𝑎1𝐷?̃?(0, 𝑡)
2 + 𝑎2?̃?
2 (126) 
Where, 𝑎1 > 0 , 𝑎2 > 0 and 𝐷 > 0, derivate of 𝑊(𝑡) with respect to time is given 




(?̃?(0, 𝑡)2) − 2𝑎2?̃??̇̂? (127) 
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Therefore, 
?̇?(𝑡) = 2𝑎1𝐷?̃?(0, 𝑡)?̃?𝑡(0, 𝑡) − 2𝑎2?̃??̇̂? (128) 
Substituting ?̃?𝑡(0, 𝑡) from (124) at 𝑥 = 0 






?̂?𝑥(0, 𝑡) − 𝐷𝐿1?̃?(0, 𝑡)) − 2𝑎2?̃??̇̂? 
 (129) 
The updating rule of ?̇̂? as given by (121)-(122), simplifies (129) to the following 
equation  
?̇?(𝑡) = 2𝑎1?̃?(0, 𝑡)?̃?𝑥(0, 𝑡) −  2?̃? (𝑎1
?̂?𝑥(0, 𝑡)
?̂?







 Choosing  𝑎2 = 𝑎1 and substituting the expressions of (122), we get 




2 − 2 𝑎1𝐷𝐿?̃?(0, 𝑡)
2  (131) 




2 − 2 𝑎1𝐷𝐿1|?̃?(0, 𝑡)|
2(132) 




2  (133) 







Therefore, we can conclude the negative semi definiteness of  ?̇?(𝑡). Hence, 
?̇?(𝑡) will settle on or within a bounded ball of radius 𝑅𝑜𝐶 as  𝑡 → ∞. Note that the 




− 𝐿1 < 0 
Observer II 
Observer II utilizes the estimated delay obtained from Observe I to predict states of 
the system at time 𝑡; while, only the delayed measurements at 𝑡 − 𝐷  are available.  
Assumption 15: The signal 𝑋(𝑡) is at least once differentiable with respect to time. 
Furthermore, the derivative is bounded by some finite value, i.e. |?̇?(𝑡)| < 𝑋𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀ 𝑡 >
0. 
Considering the system dynamics (104)-(105), we design the second observer as 
follows 
       ?̇̂?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̂?(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑌(𝑡) − ?̂?(𝑡)) 
?̂?(𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) (135) 
Where ?̂?(𝑡)  ∈ [𝐷 , 𝐷] is the estimated delay derived from the Observer I. 
Remark 15: Referring to (121), ?̂?(𝑡)  has a bounded derivative with respect to time.  
Substituting the (135) in the dynamic of Observer II is given as,  
?̇̂?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̂?(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑈(𝑡) + 𝐿2 (𝑌(𝑡) − C?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?(𝑡)))  (136) 
Next, by subtracting (136) from first equation of (134), the estimation error 
dynamic is derived as 
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?̇̃?(𝑡) = 𝐴?̃?(𝑡) − 𝐿2𝐶 (?̃?(𝑡 − ?̂?(𝑡))) + 𝑀(𝑡) (137) 
where, 𝐿2 is the second observer’s gain and 𝑀(𝑡) is the bounded uncertainty due the delay 
estimation error.  
With initial condition as  ?̃?(𝑡0) = ?̃?0,   ?̃?(𝑠) = 0,   𝑠 < 𝑡0, we will apply the following 
Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional for delay-dependent analysis of (137) 














where 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 × 𝑛 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 
Preposition 1: The error dynamics represented in  (34) is stable and converges to 
a bounded region exponentially, if there exist   𝐿2 > 0 and 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 × 𝑛 −
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 > 0, 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 matrix such that along trajectories of (137), the 
Lyapunov-Krasovskii function (138) satisfies the following condition [99]-[100].   
𝑊2 𝑎𝑉=
∆ − 𝑏|𝑀|2 + ?̇? < 0 (139) 
Then, the solution of (124) with initial condition of ?̃?(𝑡0) = ?̃?0 satisfies the 
inequality  
?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) < 𝑒−𝑎(𝑡−𝑡0)?̃?0






   (140) 
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Proof: Applying comparison principle [99], we have  
?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉(𝑡, ?̃?𝑡, ?̃??̇?) < 𝑒






Lyapunov candidate 𝑉 can be written as (142) as a positive definite function 











































) + ?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝐸?̃?(𝑡) + 𝑒−𝐷𝑡?̃?𝑇(𝑡 − 𝐷)𝐸?̃?(𝑡 − 𝐷) 
 (149) 














Substituting (142)-(146) and (147)-(150) in (139), we find  
𝑊2 ≤ 2?̃?
𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̇̃?(𝑡) + 𝑎?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) − 𝑏𝑀𝑇(𝑡)𝑀(𝑡)
+ 𝐷
2
?̇̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑅?̇̃?(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑒−𝑎𝐷 ∫ ?̇̃?𝑇(𝑠)𝑅?̇̃?(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−𝐷
+ ?̃?𝑇(𝑡)𝑆?̃?(𝑡) + ?̃?𝑇(𝑡)[𝑆
+ 𝐸]?̃?(𝑡) − ?̃?𝑇(𝑡 − 𝐷)𝑆?̃?(𝑡 − 𝐷) + [?̃?𝑇(𝑡 − 𝐷)𝐸(?̃?(𝑡 − 𝐷)]𝑒−𝑎𝐷 
 (151) 
Next, applying the standard arguments we obtain that 
𝑊2 ≤ 𝜂
𝑇(𝑡)Φη(𝑡) < 0        ∀η(𝑡) ≠ 0 (152) 












∗ 𝜙22 0 −𝑃3
𝑇𝐿2𝐶 𝑃3
𝑇
∗ ∗ −(𝑆 + 𝑅)𝑒−𝑎𝐷 𝑅𝑒−𝑎𝐷 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −(2𝑅 + 𝐸)𝑒−𝑎𝐷 0






< 0 (153) 
is feasible, where 
𝜙11 = 𝐴
𝑇𝑃2 + 𝑃2
𝑇 + 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑆 + 𝐸 − Re−𝑎𝐷 (154) 
𝜙12 = 𝑃 − 𝑃2
𝑇 + 𝐴𝑇𝑃3 (155) 




Thus, the following results will be obtained 
Lemma 1: Given 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐷 > 0 , let there exist 𝑛 × 𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃 >
0, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝑆 > 0, 𝐸 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 > 0 such that the LMI (153) with notation given in (154)-
(156) holds. Then, the solution of (137) satisfies (140) for all delays  𝐷 ≤ 𝐷 ≤  𝐷. 
Moreover, the ellipsoid 
𝜒∞ = {?̃? ∈ 𝑅
𝑛:  𝑋𝑇(𝑡)𝑃?̃?(𝑡) <  
𝑏
𝑎
𝐾2. ∆2} (157) 
is exponentially attractive with the decay rate 𝑎 2⁄  for all |𝑀(𝑡)|
2 ≤ 𝐾2. ∆2.   ∎  
 
 
6.3.3. Simulation Results and Discussion 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we conducted simulation 






















Where, 𝑈 is the system input as  




To illustrate the impact of the delay in the system, we simulate the system in two 
cases of no delay and 0.9 𝑠𝑒𝑐 delay in the measurements in Fig. 35. The outputs of the 
system with no delay are plotted in solid blue lines; while, the outputs of the system with 
delay are shown with red dashed lines.  
 
Figure 35. System performance in presence of delay 
To estimate the delay and states of the system in the presence of the injected delay, two 
observers are designed based on the proposed algorithm. 
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 Observer I 
A constant delay of 𝐷 = 0.9 𝑠𝑒𝑐 is injected to system output measurements in 








We model the delay with a transport PDE model where the boundary conditions of 
the PDE are related to the system dynamics. To design the observer we assume the known 























Choosing 𝐿1 large enough to satisfy (134), and initial guess of  ?̂? = 0.5 𝑠 for the 
delay, the observer estimates on delay and outputs 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?) = ?̂?(0, 𝑡) are provided in 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. To verify the convergence of Observer I, initial condition 
for states are ?̂?1(0,0) = 13, ?̂?2(0,0) = 16.5. Furthermore, we will quantify the 
convergence performance of the estimates in terms of convergence time defined as the time 
taken to reach within ±2% band of the true value starting from the incorrect initial 
condition. The delay estimation in Fig. 36 and delay estimation error in Fig. 37 prove that 
the estimated value of delay converges to the exact value of 0.9 after 15 𝑠. 
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Figure 36. Estimated delay. 
 
Figure 37. Delay estimation error 
Observe I also estimates the available outputs of the system, ?̂?(0, 𝑡) = 𝐶?̂?(𝑡 − ?̂?). 
Fig. 38, shows the estimates of the outputs considering the on-line estimated value of delay. 
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The actual outputs of the system which is can be measured in the controller are drawn with 
solid blue lines and the estimated values are shown with red dashed lines.  
 
Figure 38. Measured and estimated output. 
Fig. 39 shows the estimation error, ?̃?(0, 𝑡) = [?̃?1(0, 𝑡) ?̃?2(0, 𝑡)]
𝑇, for our case 
study. The estimation error converges to a small bounded area of ±2% band of the true 
value after 5 seconds. Along with output estimation from Observer I, Fig.40 depicts the 
original 𝑧(𝑥, 𝑡) = [𝑧1(𝑥, 𝑡) 𝑧2(𝑥, 𝑡)]
𝑇 and estimated signals ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑡) =




Figure 39. Estimation error 
 




Considering the estimated delay, obtained from Observer I, the predicted states of 
the system are derived via the second observer. To design the second observer, the 
parameters  𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0  are chosen as: 
 𝑎 = 1 , 𝑏 = 2 
These values are selected such that the LMI in (153) is satisfied and matrix Φ is 





























Therefore, the states of the system at time 𝑡 can be predicted as it is shown in Fig. 
41. Both states are initialized with incorrect values to test the convergence properties of the 
observer.  The solid blue lines are the real states of the system before being transmitted 
through the network communication and the red dashed lines represent the predicted states 
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via the proposed algorithm. As it can be demonstrated from the results, after 10 seconds, 
the predicted values converge to actual values of the states with a bounded error. The 
estimation error for both states are given in Fig. 42.    
 
Figure 41. Predicted states of the system at time 𝑡. 
 
Figure 42. Prediction errors of Observer II 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 RESILIENT STRATEGY TOWARD FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACK  
The contribution and novelty of this chapter is three fold. First,  we  develop a 
continuous  model  of  connected  vehicles equipped with CACC algorithm using the PDE 
approximation inspired by the extensive literature on traffic dynamics [7], [13]; The  PDE  
model simplifies  the  analysis  regarding  to  system behavior and attack detection. 
Furthermore, stability analysis regarding to delay and perturbation proportion is further easy 
for PDE modeling comparing to ODE model of connected vehicles.  The results of this 
chapter are obtained by analyzing the PDE; they are then validated by simulation of a 
dynamic equations of a platoon of 15 vehicles. 
Second, we model an intelligent false data injection attack in the DSRC with fake 
vehicle identities. The  fake (ghost) vehicles in the  platoon  disrupt  the  smooth  vehicle  
density by  corrupting  desire  the  inter-vehicle  distances. The ghost vehicles following the 
same dynamics of CACC strategy. Hence, the false data injected attack studied in  this  
chpater, is not possible to detect with current attack detection methods developed based on 
sensor faults detection methodologies. 
 Third, we propose a novel diagnosis scheme using active control concept to detect 
false data injection attack in the vehicle platooning system. The proposed diagnosis 
algorithm consist of  a  series  of  PDE  observers  to  provide  information of  the  location  
of  the  injected  ghost  vehicles  in  the  platoon. The most significant advantage of using a 
PDE based analysis is that the PDE reveals perturbations, better than the discrete equations 
do. The proposed scheme is capable of (1) detecting the occurrence of false data injection; 
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and (2) determining the position of fake data injected into the platoon as fake (ghost) 
vehicles. It is worth mentioning that we don’t apply the centralized controller to connected 
vehicle.  Indeed,  each individual  vehicle  has  its  own  decentralized  CACC  strategy with  
works  as  its  ODE  version.  However, we develop just one centralized observer into the 
leader vehicle to identify the false data injection attack.  
7.1. PDE Modeling of the Platoon (Combine with attack) 
The notation in this section is a little different from the rest of the thesis. Therefore, 
we redefine parameters of the platoon as follows.  
Consider a homogeneous platoon of connected vehicles equipped with CACC 
strategy. The vehicles follow their leader in a single lane (see Fig.43). Each vehicle in the 
platoon is equipped with on-board sensors to measure the relative distance and velocity with 
respect to its preceding. In addition, each vehicle receives the acceleration information of 




Figure 43 : A platoon of CACC. 
Remark 16: In this study, the leader vehicle follows a constant velocity profile with 
a perturbation for diagnosis purposes. Hence, the velocity profiles of the vehicles in the 
platoon are not constant.  









    
    
    (163) 
Where  𝑆𝑚 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚}  is the set of all vehicles in the platoon of length of 𝑚, 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖−1 − 𝑞𝑖 + 𝐿𝑖 + 𝑑𝑠 is the distance between vehicle 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1, 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖−1 are the 
rear bumper position of vehicles 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1. The length of vehicle 𝑖 is presented by 𝐿𝑖, 𝑑𝑠 
is the minimum safety distance between two vehicles, 𝑉𝑖 denotes the velocity of vehicle 𝑖. 
Moreover, 𝑈𝑖 is the desired acceleration and acts as the vehicle control input [30]. 
The control strategy regarding to the inter-vehicle spacing obtains as follows 
𝐷𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ𝑉𝑖(𝑡), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑚\{1} (164) 
 where 𝐷𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) is the desire relative distance between vehicles 𝑖 and 𝑖 − 1 and ℎ is the time 
headway. Without losing the generality, to simplify the analysis, we consider 𝑑𝑠 = 0  and 
𝐿𝑖 = 0. The main objective of platooning is to regulate the 𝐷𝑖 to 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 , i.e.  
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐷𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑟,𝑖(𝑡) → 0   as     𝑡 → ∞ (165) 
Substituting (164) and 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖−1 − 𝑞𝑖 in (165), the error is re-written as: 
       1i i i iE t q t q t hV t    (166) 
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The vehicle control input of each vehicle in the platoon (𝑈𝑖) except the leader one 
depends on the preceding vehicle control input (𝑈𝑖−1). Hence, this architecture employ a 
decentralized control scheme. Next, we consider the following dynamic controller to 
achieve the zero regulation error: 
1
1 1 1
( )i i P i D i iU U K E K E U
h h h
    
  (167) 
where 𝑈𝑖−1 and 𝑉𝑖−1 are the desired acceleration and velocity of the preceding vehicle 
received through DSRC network. The parameters 𝐾𝑃, 𝐾𝐷>0 are controller gains designed 
such that (i) the inter-vehicle distance is maintained to 𝐷𝑟,𝑖 and, (ii) 𝑈𝑖 changes smoothly 
and remains bounded.  
Remark 17: Referring to (167), the control signal of vehicle 𝑖 (𝑈𝑖) which is obtained 
from CACC algorithm, depends on (1) states of vehicle i (𝐷𝑖, 𝑉𝑖, and 𝑈𝑖), and (2) the 
transmitted information from the preceding vehicle (𝑈𝑖−1). 
Next, we make the following assumptions: 
Assumption 16: We consider a homogeneous platoon of vehicles. Therefore, all 
vehicles in the platoon are identical and have the same parameters e.g. mass, inertia, rolling 
resistance coefficient.  
Assumption 17: Each vehicle in the platoon measures relative distance with respect 
to preceding vehicle 𝐷𝑖. 
Remark 18: Vehicle 𝑖 measures the relative velocity via radar and hence can compute the 
absolute velocity 𝑉𝑖−1 of vehicle 𝑖 − 1. Vehicle 𝑖 also receives acceleration 𝑈𝑖−1 
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information of vehicle 𝑖 − 1 via DSRC network. Both these measurements are subjected 
to measurement noises and uncertainties.   
The leader vehicle in the platoon follows a fixed constant velocity trajectory. Hence, 
the desired velocity and relative distance between vehicles are 𝑉𝑑 and 𝐷𝑠,𝑟 = ℎ𝑉𝑑 = ∆   
respectively. By imposing constant velocity trajectories, the position of each vehicle in the 
platoon is obtained as 𝑞1(𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑𝑡 and 𝑞𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑𝑡 − (𝑚 − 1)𝛿. Therefore, each vehicle 
trys to regulate its relative distance from its preceding vehicle to ∆ using CACC strategy. 
Next, we develop a new coordinate as "Normalized Coordinate" to facilitate the 

























where  𝐿 = 𝑚 × ∆ denotes the platoon length. Fig. 44(b) presents the schematic of the 
platoon in the new coordinates. In the normal coordinate we get, 𝑦𝑖(𝑡) ∈ [0,1], 𝑦1(𝑡) ≡ 1, 
and 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) ≡ 0, where 𝑦1(𝑡) and 𝑦𝑚(𝑡) refer to leader's and last vehicle's positions 
respectively. Here, we have implicitly assumed that the deviations of the vehicle positions 
and velocities from their desired values are small.  
The dynamics of the vehicle i in the normalized coordinate are given by 
i iy u   (168) 
i iy v   (169) 
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Figure 44: Platoon with vehicles moving in a single lane (a) A platoon with leader and 




. The desired spacing and velocities are   






   
  (170) 
and the desired position of the vehicle 𝑖 is 
, ( ) 1d iy t i     (171) 
The position and velocity errors for the ith vehicle in the normalized coordinate are 
given by 
,( ) ( ) ( )i i d iy t y t y t    (172) 
( ) ( ) ( )i i d iv t v t v v t     (173) 
( ) ( ) ( )i i d iu t u t u u t    (174)  
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Also, regarding to (167), it is useful to introduce the front relative position errors for the 
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   
  (176) 
For  =  1, . . . , 𝑚 . The quantities 𝑒𝑖(𝑡) and ?̇?𝑖(𝑡) denote the relative position and relative 
velocity errors between the ith and its predecessor 𝑖 − 1 vehicle. 





i i i i i
k k
u u u e e
h h h
   
  (177) 
The relative errors, including the velocity error, are computed by on-board devices 
such as GPS, radars, and speed sensors. Consistent with the decentralized linear control 
architecture, the dynamics of control signal 𝑢𝑖 of the vehicle 𝑖 is assumed to depend on 1) 
its acceleration 𝑢𝑖, 2) its preceding acceleration, 𝑢𝑖−1 which is received through DSRC 
network, 3) relative velocity, 2) the relative position errors between itself and its preceding 
vehicle.  
PDE Model of Platoon 
 
In this section, we develop a continuous PDE approximation of the discrete platoon 
dynamics modelled in section II. Note that the discrete platoon dynamics refers to the model 
of platoon explained with ODE set of equations (168)-(177). This model is discrete with 
respect to space and is continuous with respect to time. The PDE is derived with respect to 
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a scaled spatial coordinate explained in section II with lower case states 𝑦𝑖(𝑡), 𝑣𝑖(𝑡), and 
𝑢𝑖(𝑡). Hence, to make the spatially discrete ODE based model to a continuous model, we 
define a new position parameter 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]. In effect, the two symbols 𝑥 and 𝑦 correspond 
to the same coordinate representation but, are used here to distinguish the continuous and 
discrete formulations [103].   
The first step to develop the PDE model is to define the continuous approximation. 
Referring to normalized coordinate, every car is nominally assumed to lie within an interval 
of length ∆ (see Fig. 44(b)). For the purpose of a continuous approximation, we expand each 
vehicle over its interval to have a constant mean density (vehicles per unit length) as (178) 






  (178) 
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   (179) 
This approximation grantees that velocity profile in the PDE approximation changes 
smoothly in the length of platoon (𝑥).  
Next, we define the density of the platoon, 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡), represents the quantity regarding 
to vehicles per unit of length. Local density of, 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡), at spatial coordinate 𝑥 ∈  [0,1] and 
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time 𝑡 ∈  [0,∞) relates to the velocity 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) using the continuity equation of the 







    (180) 
As it can be interpreted from (180), the perturbation in the density causes by the 
dynamics of the individual vehicles in the platoon. Local density 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) increases 
(decreases) as the cars move closer (apart). In order to analyze small perturbations about the 
mean values (equilibrium point of the system), we define the perturbed quantities ?̅?, ?̅? as 
0 0( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ),x t x t v x t v v x t        (181) 
Therefore, for small perturbations around mean values we can linearized (181) to  
0
0 0 0 0( )v v v v
t t t
 
   
  
    
     (182) 
recalling (169), we have the mean velocity equals to zero, 𝑣0 = 𝑣𝑑 = 0 and we know 𝜌0 is 
constant. Thus, we can re-write (182) as  
0 00
v v
t x t x
 
 
   
    
      (183) 
  This equation is consistent with the physical intuition whereby a positive gradient in 
velocity (due to say the predecessor speeding up or the follower slowing down) will cause 
the local density to decrease. In order to study density perturbations, one thus needs to 
specify the velocity which arises due to the linearized momentum balance:  
  
( , )
( , ) ( , )
v x t




   (184) 
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  where 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) is the control signal developed by CACC strategy and equals to acceleration 
of the vehicle. To develop the continuous approximation of the acceleration, 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡), we 
consider two terms of (172) and approximate each term separately in the rest of this section.  
First term in (172) as  
1 1 ( , )[ ]
i
i i i i
x y







   (185) 
second term is 
1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( )i i i i i
i i





     
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e t x t dx x t  
 
    
  (188) 
by the Mean Value Theorem [103]-[104], where 𝑥+ ∈ [𝑦𝑖, 𝑦𝑖−1] . Therefore, we can 
approximate (188) with 
0
1
( , ) ( , )ie x t x t 

 
  (189) 
Thus, referring to (177), we will construct a PDE approximation of discrete dynamics in 
terms of these continuous approximations as  
0 0 0
1
( , ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( , )[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i i i i
p d
x y x y x y x y
k k
u x t u x t x t x t
h x h h
   
  




  (190) 
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where, 𝑘𝑝 and 𝑘𝑑 are used to denote continuous approximations of discrete gains 𝐾𝑃 and 
𝐾𝐷 respectively. Then, we arrive at the partial differential equation (PDE) as a model of 
the discrete platoon dynamics by 
0 0 0
1
( , ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( , )
p d
k k
u x t u x t x t x t
t h x h h





  (191)  
applying (182) into the last term of (191), we get    
0 0
1
( , ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( , )
p d
k k
u x t u x t x t v x t







using the following notation  
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    (193) 
The state space representation for PDE model of a platoon of vehicles equipped with 
CACC strategy is given as  
      , ,tv x t u x t   (194) 
   0














  (196) 
  In this section, we assume that the attacker has knowledge about dynamics of vehicles 
into the platoon. Therefore, to implement a non-trivial attack, the attacker designs the fake 
vehicle dynamics similar the dynamics other real vehicles in the platoon. Indeed, this fake 
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vehicle does not provide wrong sensor/actuator information and can not be detected with 
aforementioned methodologies. Injecting fake vehicles into the platoon, directly impacts 
the density perturbation in the string. Hence, we can express the effect of fake vehicles as 
false data injection attack by  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) a a ax t x t x t      (197) 
where, ∆𝜌(𝑥𝑎, 𝑡𝑎) presents the effect of fake vehicles injection at position 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑎 and time 
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎 in the platoon. In this attack scenario, apart from detecting the attack occurrence, 
isolating the injection point of the attack is crucial and requires more analysis. Furthermore, 
the injection point of the attack determines which vehicles in the platoon are the fake 
(ghost) vehicles. In this chapter, to detect the exact position of the false data injection 
attack, we take advantages of (i) cascading nature of the platoon which makes delay in 
responding to any perturbation in the driving profile. (ii) PDE modeling of the whole 
platoon to develop a centralize health monitoring option for platoon. 
Therefore, as an overview for the proposed scheme in this chapter to detect the false data 
injection attack, the following guideline is provided: 
Remark 19: False data injection attack as fake vehicles does not occur in the leader and 
last vehicle of the platoon. Hence, the first and last vehicles in the platoon are real vehicles.  
7.2. Diagnostics Approach  
In this section, we develop a novel diagnosis scheme based on PDE model of the platoon 
to detect and isolate the false data injection attack. The isolation of false data injection 
attack in a platoon of connected vehicles equals to identifying the position of the fake 
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(ghost) vehicle in the string. The proposed diagnosis algorithm works based on the 
following guideline: 
Step-1: Model the attack as injected fake vehicles in the platoon changing the density 
parameter in the platoon PDE model;   
Step-2: Design PDE-based observer to estimate the states of the system in no attack 
scenario;  
Step-3: Derive two residuals using the estimates and measured values of velocity and 
acceleration of the vehicles in the platoon; 
Step-4: Analyse residuals behavior in both no attack and under attack scenario to develop 
unique signature for each case; 
We design the state estimation scheme to estimate all states of the PDE model consisting 
of ?̅?(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) using available information. The observer is designed and 
implemented in the leader vehicle to monitor whole platoon performance using just one 
observer. We assume information regarding to velocity and acceleration of all vehicles in 
the platoon is available in the leader vehicle.  
Assumption 18: All vehicles in the platoon share their acceleration and velocity 
information through the DSRC network with the leader vehicle since the DSRC is a broad 
casting shared network.  
Remark 20: Available information through the DSRC network are subjected to network 
uncertainties and measurement noise.  
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Estimation Scheme  
Considering assumption 18, in the observer design we have access 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) for 
whole platoon for ∀ 𝑡 > 0. The following structure is chosen for the PDE observer which 
is implemented into the leader vehicle.  
11 12
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ( , ))tv x t u x t L v x t L u x t     (198) 
0 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ))t xx t v x t L u x t      (199) 
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0 0 0








   
  (200) 
with the following boundary conditions derived from leader vehicle  
ˆ ˆ(1, ) (1, ), (1, ) (1, )v t v t u t u t    (201) 
where, 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡), ?̂̅?(𝑥, 𝑡),, and ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑡) are estimates of 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡), ?̅?(𝑥, 𝑡), and 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) 
respectively. 𝐿11, 𝐿12  𝐿2 and 𝐿3 are observer gains to be determined.  
Remark 21: Considering each vehicle in the platoon as a point. We have point 
measurement based on ODE model of the platoon. However, we used PDE approximation 
in section II to develop a continuous mode. Similar approximations and assumptions are 
applied for the observer design.    
Furthermore, estimation error parameters including ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡), ?̃̅?(𝑥, 𝑡) and ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) are defined 
as  
ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
v x t v x t v x t
x t x t x t




    (202) 
Subtracting (194)-(196) from (198)-(200),the error dynamics of the observer are given by 
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11 12( , ) ( , ) (  ( , )) ( ( , ))tv x t u x t L v x t L u x t     (203) 












   
  (205) 
with boundary condition of  
(1, ) 0, (1, ) 0v t u t    (206) 
Theorem 1: Consider system modeled by (194)-(196) and the observer designed as (198)-
(200). There exist observer gains 𝐿11, 𝐿12  𝐿2 and 𝐿3 such that the error dynamics (203)-
(205), converges to bounded area in finite time, in the presence of no faults and cyber-
attacks.   
 
Proof: we provide the proof for this theorem in two stages using Lyapunov analysis 






( ) ( , ) ( , )V t v x t v x t dx  ‖ ‖  (207)  
As it can be inferred from (207), for ∀ 𝑥 > 0 and ∀ 𝑡 > 0, 𝑉1(𝑡) > 0 when ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) ≠ 0 . 








( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( )V t v x t u x t L v x t L u x t dx     (209) 






( ) ( , ) ( )V t v x t dx L V t      (210) 
Considering any positive initial value of 𝑉1(𝑡 = 0) =  𝑉1(0) > 0 we can write  
11
1 1( ) (0)
L tV t V e
  (211) 
Hence,  𝑉1(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ asymptotically with the weight of 𝐿11. Consequently, 
?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞. Next, we analyze the error dynamics (204)-(205) using the 






( ) ( , ) ( , )
2 2
b
V t x t dx u x t dx  
  (212) 
where 𝑏1 > 0. Differentiating the Lyapunov function candidate along the solution of (203)-




( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )t tV t x t x t dx b u x t u x t dx      (213) 
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  (214) 
     For simplicity, we drop (𝑥, 𝑡) term from the functions 
1 1











V t v dx u L b dx
h
k b









  (215) 
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Choosing 𝐿11 large enough which assures a fast convergence of ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0, we can 
conclude that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑣𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝑣𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡). Hence, we can neglect terms 
related to 𝑣𝑥 in (215) and simplify it to 
1 1 1
21
2 2 1 1 320 0 0
0 0
( ) ( )p x
k b




      
  (216) 








  (217) 
The fisrt term in the right hand side of (216) equals to zero. Therefore, the derivative of 𝑉2 








V t uu dx b L u dx
h
  
  (218) 
Now integrating the first term of the right hand side of (218) we have    
1




( , ) | (1, ) | | (0, ) | | (0, ) |
2 2 2
] ( )xuu dx u x t u t u t u t    
  (219) 
Next, considering (219) and applying the definition of norm on the second term of right 






( ) | (0, ) |
2
b
V t u t b L u dx
h
   




( ) | (0, ) | ( ) 0
2
b
V t u t b L u t
h
   ‖ ‖
  (221) 
Choosing 𝐿3 > 0 and 𝑏1 > 0, ?̇?2(𝑡) ≤ 0 ∀𝑡 ≥ 0 which describe the decaying behavior 
of 𝑉2(𝑡). Hence, if  we restrict the initial conditions so that 𝑉2(𝑡 = 0) = 𝑉2(0) is bounded, 
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the Lyapunov function 𝑉2(𝑡) ≤ 𝑉2(0) remains bounded for all 𝑡 ≥ 0 . Therefore, we obtain 
the uniformly boundedness of ‖?̃?‖2and ‖?̃̅?‖2 are bounded [98]. Further, to prove the 





( )M t b L u dx     (222) 
Therefore, from (220) and (222) we can conclude  
2 ( ) ( )V t M t   (223) 




( ) ( ) tV t M t b L uu dx      (224) 
Substituting ?̃?𝑡  from (215), and using fact that ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0 and ?̃?𝑥(𝑥, 𝑡) → 0, (222) , we get  
1 1 11 3 2 21 3
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     
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   ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖
  (226) 
Since we have measurement on 𝑢(0, 𝑡) we can select ?̂?(0, 𝑡) close to actual value with 
error of measurement noise. Therefore, |?̃?(0, 𝑡)| is bounded. Also, we know ‖?̃?‖2and 
‖?̃̅?‖2 are uniformly bounded. Therefore, referring to (226) we can conclude ?̇?(𝑡) is 
bounded and equivalently proves the boundedness of ?̈?2(𝑡) as 
2 ( ) ( )V t M t     (227) 
Furthermore, the boundedness of ?̈?2(𝑡) concludes that ?̇?2(𝑡) is uniformly continuous. 
Hence, applying Barbalat lemma [92]on ?̇?2(𝑡) along with the fact that 𝑉2(𝑡) is bounded, 
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we obtain ?̇?2(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞ . At this point, we proved the stability of the estimation 
error dynamics which converges to zero as 𝑡 → ∞. 
 
7.3. Attack Diagnostics 
The main idea behind attack diagnosis in this chapter is using the perturbation in velocity 
profile to poke the inherent effects of the attack which makes the detection easier. Indeed, 
the ghost vehicles develop disturbances (changes) in the local density of the platoon. The 
leader vehicle perform a small perturbation on the constant velocity profile to detect the 
attack and isolate the injected point of the attack in the platoon. Next, we explain in detail 
how the attack is diagnosed using the PDE model and the aforementioned idea.    
Applying the selected observer gains into the estimation error dynamics explained in(203)-
(205), we get  

























   
  (230) 
   
with boundary condition of  
(1, ) 0, (1, ) 0v t u t    (231) 
 127 
Since, velocity and acceleration of vehicles in the platoon are the two available 




ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
r x t v x t v x t v x t
r x t u x t u x t u x t
  
  
  (232) 
We have analysed the stability of estimation errors dynamics in section V. Under no false 
data injection attack, we proved that the estimation error dynamics converge to zero as 𝑡 →
∞. Equivalently, with no attack in the platoon, both residuals 𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡) and 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) converge 
to zero. This signature of two residuals is considered as no attack signature.  
Next, we analyse the behavior of the residuals in the occurrence of false data injection 
attack. In case the attack formulated in (197), ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) will converge to zero with same 
Lypupanov analyse. However, dynamics of the acceleration perturbation in (230) changes 
to   
32 2
0 0 0 0
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( , )
p pd
t x x a a
k kk
u x t u x t x t v x t L u x t x t
h h h h
 
   
     
  (233) 
So, the derivation of Lyupanov function𝑉2(𝑡)  will have additional term in (221) as the 








V t u t b L u t u x t
h
    ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖
  (234) 
Therefore, under false data injection attack scenario, the second Lyapunov function 𝑉2(𝑡) 
for analysing convergence of ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) and ?̃̅?(𝑥, 𝑡) will converge to a bounded region. 
Equivalently, ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) and consequently, residual 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) converges to a bounded area. 
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Finally, we can conclude that, in the presence of the false data injection attack, first 
residual, 𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡), will not change; while, the second residual, 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡), will converge to a 
bounded non-zero value. This signature of the residuals is considered as false data injection 
attack signature.   
One of the possible ways to deal with attack detection using residual values is to use 
nonzero threshold set based on no attack behavior of the system. Hence, in the next step, 
we select constant threshold values for the obtained residuals in no-attack situation using 
the probability distribution method. In this method, first we need to collect residual data, 
𝑟𝑖(𝑥, 𝑡), 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} under no attack scenario of platoon operation. Next, using the 
probability distribution characteristics such as mean and standard deviation, we set a 
constant threshold for each residual. The constant thresholds 𝛾𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} as selected 
such that the probability of false alarms calculated with are acceptable. where,  𝛾𝑖 is the 
selected constant threshold on residual 𝑟𝑖.     
 
0 0( ) ( ) ,
i
i






  (235) 
where, 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖  i is the probability of attack false alarm in , 𝛾𝑖 is the selected threshold for false 
data injection attack and 𝑝0(𝑥) is the 𝑟𝑖(𝑥, 𝑡) probability distribution under no attack in the 
platoon. The goal here is to select 𝛾𝑖which will yield an acceptable 𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑖. 
Finally, we can conclude the residual analysis in both no-attack and under attack scenarios 
with the following remark. 
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Remark 22: The residuals signature is evaluated to determine if false data injection attack 
occurs into the connected vehicle platoon. In case of no attack in the system, the signature 
of residuals is |𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾1,  and |𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾2; when the residual signature shows 
|𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡)| < 𝛾1 and |𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡)| > 𝛾2 it determines a false data injection attack is detected in 




7.4. Results and Discussion  
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm using the simulation 
studies. We consider a platoon of fifteen (𝑚 = 15) identical vehicles equipped with CACC 
strategy. Most of the simulation parameter of the platoon are taken similar to existing 
literature [30],[64]. The controller gains are constant for all vehicles, i.e., 𝑘𝑝(𝑥)  =  𝐾𝑃  =
 0.7 and 𝑘𝑑(𝑥)  =  𝐾𝐷  =  2.5 and the headway is selected as ℎ =  0.2 𝑠. The desired inter-
vehicle distance is considered as ∆= ℎ𝑉𝑑 and desired velocity is  𝑉𝑑  =  20 𝑚/𝑠. The initial 
velocity of all vehicles was chosen as the desired velocity and the initial position of the 
vehicle was determined as 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑉𝑑𝑡 + (𝑖 − 1)∆. As a result, the initial relative position 
error and velocity error of every vehicle was zero except for the first vehicle. The first 
vehicle has a velocity perturbation of 𝑣(1, 𝑡) = 𝑣0(𝑡) = 0.24𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑡) which cause an 
acceleration perturbation as 𝑢(1, 𝑡) = 𝑢0(𝑡) = 0.24𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡) with respect to the desired 
velocity 𝑉𝑑  =  20 𝑚/𝑠 and desired acceleration 𝑈𝑑  =  0 𝑚/𝑠
2.  
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Since the controller gains 𝐾𝑃 and 𝐾𝐷 are constant, the controller gains in the continuous 
PDE model are the same. Based upon the Lyapunov analysis discussed in section V, the 
observers gain are selected as 𝐿11 = 700, 𝐿12 = 1, 𝐿2 = −
2𝑘𝑝
ℎ𝜌0
2 and 𝐿3 = 50. As it is 
mentioned in assumption 18, the leader vehicle receives information of velocity and 
acceleration of each vehicle in the platoon. To analysis a realistic scenario, we consider 
zero mean Gaussian noises as measurement noise for all available velocity and acceleration 
measurements. Velocity measurement noises have standard deviation of 𝜎𝑣 = 2𝑐 𝑚 𝑠 ⁄ and 
acceleration measurement noises have standard deviation of 𝜎𝑢 = 3𝑐 𝑚 𝑠
2⁄  [109]. To test 
the convergence properties, observers in the proposed scheme are initialized with incorrect 
values except for the leader vehicle. Since, the PDE observers are designed and 
implemented in the leader vehicle, the observers have access to the exact measured data of 
velocity and acceleration of the leader vehicle as it is formulated in (201).    
Next we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under the following cases. 
Case 1: The scenario that the platoon operates in normal condition with no false data 
injection attack; and Case 2: the case study in which false data injection attack occurred 
into the system by injecting fake vehicles using fake identity. For each case, the simulation 
is run for 70 seconds and the obtained results are further discussed in more details. 
Case 1: No Fault Scenario 
 In this case we consider an ideal communication network in the platoon with no false data 
injection attack. The velocity perturbation in the whole platoon is demonstrated in Fig. 44. 
Referring to PDE formulation (194)-(196), the leader vehicle is placed at 𝑥 = 1 while the 
last vehicle in the platoon is represented at 𝑥 = 0. Fig.45 depicts the minimum velocity 
 131 
perturbation in the leader vehicle at 𝑥 = 1. However, as it is expected, the perturbation is 
propagated through the length of platoon as we have the largest perturbation in the last 
vehicle on the string. The velocity perturbation in the leader vehicle is 𝑣(1, 𝑡) =
 0.24 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝑡) with maximum amplitude of 0.24 𝑚/𝑠. This value is almost tripled in last 
vehicle in the platoon with maximum of  0.64 𝑚/𝑠.  
 An overshoot in the transient behavior of the vehicles in the platoon is noticeable in the 
velocity perturbation simulation results. Note that, each vehicle in the platoon receives 
information of the preceding vehicle as inputs. Therefore, the velocity of each vehicle is 
an output to the receiving information and has transient phase which will propagate through 
the platoon. The initial overshoot which is more detectable in the last vehicle of the platoon 
(at 𝑥 = 0) is because of step response to receiving perturbation.   
 
Figure 45: Velocity perturbation in the platoon 
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Figure 46: Estimated velocity perturbation in the platoon 
 
Fig. 46 shows the estimate value of velocity perturbation for whole platoon which is 
obtained with the observers designed in section V. To verify the convergence properties of 
the proposed scheme, observers are initialized with incorrect values of velocity 
perturbation, acceleration perturbation and density perturbation. The estimation error of 
the velocity perturbation is given in Fig. 47. As it can be inferred, the estimate value 
converges to actual value of velocity perturbation. The estimation error converges to zero 
asymptotically with the rate of 𝐿11 = 700 with measurement noise.  
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Figure 47: Estimation error for velocity perturbation in the platoon 
 
Fig. 48 represents the actual acceleration perturbation in vehicles in our case study platoon. 
As it can be demonstrated from this plot, the acceleration perturbation also propagates 
through the platoon from the leader to the last follower in the string. The acceleration 
perturbation of the leader vehicle is 𝑢(1, 𝑡)  =  0.24 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡) with maximum amplitude of  
0.24 𝑚/𝑠2, while the maximum acceleration perturbation in the vehicle in the platoon 
reaches to 0.64 𝑚/𝑠2. Similar to the velocity perturbation, the transient response of the 




Figure 48: Actual acceleration perturbation in the platoon 
 
The estimate value of acceleration perturbation in the platoon is give by Fig. 49. Except 
for the leader vehicle, the initial acceleration perturbation values for all vehicles in the 
platoon is chosen incorrectly to test the convergence properties of observers. Fig. 50 
presents the error between actual measured acceleration permutation and the estimate 
values in the whole platoon. As it is shown in the plot, the estimation error converges to a 
bounded area in finite time.  
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Figure 49: Estimated acceleration perturbation in the platoon 
 
Figure 50: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation in the platoon 
 
Density perturbation in the platoon, 𝜌 (𝑥, 𝑡) is represented in Fig. 51 as function of position 
(vehicle in the platoon) and time. The leader vehicle has a density perturbation value of 
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𝜌 (1, 𝑡) =  −3.6 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑡). As it is expected the perturbation is propagated into the platoon 
and the last vehicle in the platoon has a maximum density perturbation of 10.3. Since the 
perturbation is a function of velocity, the initial transient response reaches to steady state 
in less than 5 seconds. 
 
The estimate value of density perturbation for whole platoon is depicted in Fig. 52 and the 
estimation error is given by Fig. 53. As it can be inferred from the plot, the estimated 
density perturbation converges to its actual value in finite time. The error of the estimation 
remains less than 0.5 which verifies convergence properties proved in Section V using 
Lyapunov method. The value of ?̃?(1, 𝑡) represents the estimation error of density 
perturbation in leader vehicle. Since the observer is designed in the leader vehicle, both 
estimate value and actual value of density perturbation in position of leader vehicle, 𝑥 = 1 
are same. Hence, ?̃?(1, 𝑡) = 0, however, for the rest of the platoon, due to the existence of 
measurement noise in velocity and acceleration, and incorrect chosen initial values of 





Figure 51: Actual density perturbation in the platoon 
 
Figure 52: Estimated density perturbation in the platoon 
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Figure 53: Estimation error for density perturbation in the platoon 
Next, we define two constant thresholds for the obtained residuals, 𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡) = ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) and 
𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) = ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡)using the concept explained in section V. Since only second residual 
𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) is critical to determine the false data injection attack, we mainly focus on this 
residual. Analysing the obtained data for ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) in this section under no attack , we select 
|𝛾2(𝑥, 𝑡)| =  0.03 to determine the boundary for threshold as shown in Fig. 54. Therefore, 
if the residual 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) exceed the threshold |𝛾2(𝑥, 𝑡)| we interpret the event as false data 
injection attack occurrence.  
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Figure 54: Residual probabilty desnity for thereshold setting  
 
Case 2: Fault Data Injection Scenario 
 
In this scenario, we inject the fake vehicles as false data injection attack into the platoon. 
We consider two fake vehicles to be injected in the middle of the platoon between vehicle 
number 7 and 8. These fake vehicles add additional density into the platoon in the injected 
point. Hence, the estimated density perturbation will not match with the actual density 
perturbation in the disrupted point in the platoon. The proposed algorithm is capable of 
detecting the density disruption as well as identifying the position of the attack in the 
platoon system. Fig. 55 depicts the first residual, 𝑟1(𝑥, 𝑡) equivalent to estimation error for 
velocity perturbation, ?̃?(𝑥, 𝑡) under false data injection attack scenario. As it is discussed 
in Subsection B of Section V, we destined the observers such that the first residual does 
not show the effect of the attack. However, the second residual, 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) corresponding to 
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estimation error for acceleration perturbation has non-zero value when attack occurs into 
the system. Fig. 56 represent estimation error of acceleration perturbation for the whole 
platoon. As it can be inferred, the estimation error converges to a has non-zero bounded 
value at 𝑥 =  0.5 corresponding to 7th vehicle of the platoon representing of attack 
occurrence. Since the attack remains in the system for whole time of the simulation, the 
non-zero value of the estimation error remains for all time of the simulation  𝑡 ∈  [0,80]. 
To illustrate the attack detection using the pre-defined threshold, Fig. 46 shows the residual 
𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) with the constant threshold, 𝛾2(𝑥, 𝑡)  = 0.03. The pre-defined threshold 𝛾2(𝑥, 𝑡) is 
depicted via pink surfaces at 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) = 0.03 and 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) = −0.03. It can be inferred from 
the Fig.57, in the occurrence of the false data injection attack, the residual 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) surpasses 
the set threshold declaring that the attack is happening in the system. 
 
Figure 55: Estimation error for velocity perturbation under false data attack injection 
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Figure 57: Estimation error for acceleration perturbation as residual 𝑟2(𝑥, 𝑡) under 
false data attack injection 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DECISION MAKING   
To combine the aformationed strategies in an integrated control strategy, a hybrid format 
controller is required to determine which types of cyber-attacks is happening in the system 
and what is the coresponiding strategy to minimize the effect of that specific attack. To 
achive this objective, we design a descion maker using optimum control algorithm to 
choose the best control signal among the avialbable choices. We formulate the optimization 
problem with a MPC problem in which the cost function penalize the agresive driving 








Figure 58: Hybrid system scheme 
8.1. Problem Formulation  
 
In this section, we refere to the two strategeis proposed in chapter five and chapter seven 
for packet dorpping and denial of service attack respectively. We develop a scenario 
including both packet dropping phenomena and DoS attack to illustrate the effectiveness 
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of the decision making algorithm in selecting right strategy. Indeed, in each sample time, 
the decsion making block receives three choices of control signal as 
1- Actual Control Signal: This is the actual control singal obtained from the CACC 
algorithm while actual information received through the DSRC network. The 
information received through DSRC network is subjected to packet dropping and DoS 
attack. In fact, the Actual Control signal is the control signal without applying any 
resilient strategy. We refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 
2- Packet Dropout Control Signal: This control singal is the output of the modified CACC 
while the strategy of the packet dropping phenomena is applied into the system. We 
refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 
3- Denial of Service Control Signal: This control singal is the output of the modified 
CACC while the strategy of the denial of srvice attack is applied into the system. We 
refer to this control signal as 𝑢𝐷𝑜𝑆_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 
Intuitively, we expect that, the packet dorpping srategy acts better than DoS attack 
strategy when there is packet dropping phenomena in the communicaiton network. In 
contrast, we expect that the strategy of the DoS attack has a better perfoamnce comparint to 
the packet dropping strategy when there is actually a DoS attack in the DSRC network.  
We formulate the MPC problem as  
min
𝑢𝑖∈ 𝑈
𝐽 =  ∑ 𝜔1𝑑𝑖
2 + 𝜔2𝑢𝑖
2
𝑖=1,…,𝑁  (236) 
where, 𝑈 = {𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 , 𝑢𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑, 𝑢𝐷𝑜𝑆_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑  } 
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8.2. Simulation results 
For the simulation scenario, we consider a US06 driving cycle as the velocity profile for 
the leader vehicle. Similar to the rest of the simulation scenarios in this research we 
consider a platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC strategy. To illustrate the effectiveness 
of the proposed algorithm we discuss the performance of Vehicle 3 in the platoon as an 
example.  
The simulation run for 600 seconds, the first 50 seconds the communication network works 
ideally with no packet dropping or delay. At t=50 for 250 seconds we inject the DoS attack 
with an effect of = 5 𝑠 . After the DoS attack, we consider the network works ideally again 
for another 100 seconds. At time t= 400 s, we inject packet dropping failure into the DSRC 
network with 𝜆 = 0.3 (the probability of losing data) which remains till the end of the 
simulation time. Fig. 59 shows the relative distance of Vehicle 3 with respect to its 
predecessor vehicle (𝑑3) under different strategies with the explained attack in the 
communication network. The ideal behavior of the Vehicle 3 when there is no attack or 
packet dropping in DSRC is depicted with blue curve as a criteria for comparison. The 
actual relative distance  𝑑3 is shown with solid black curve. The actual signal represents 
the actual behavior of the Vehicle 3 under DoS attack and packet dropping while there is 
no strategy applied in the controller. As we can see in more visualized plot in Fig. 60, in 5 
points of the plot, the relative distance is less than zero representing accident with the 
preceding car. Next, we apply only the packet dropping strategy on the controller and the 
result is shown with dashed green curve. Similarly, we only apply the DoS attack strategy 
and the result of the Vehicle 3 relative distance is shown via dashed red line. As it can be 
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inferred from Fig. 59, the packet dropping algorithm help the Vehicle 3 to behave very 
close to its ideal performance in part of the simulation when packet dropping occurs in the 
DSRC network. However, the packet dropping strategy fails to help the Vehicle 3 when 
DoS attack is happening the communication network. In contrast, DoS attack strategy acts 
very well in the time slot that actually DoS attack is injected in the DSRC network while, 
it is not resilient toward packet dropping phenomena. The acceleration data is also provided 
in Fig. 61, illustrating similar argument results.  
 
 
Figure 59: Relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), DSRC 
under attack while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack 









































Figure 60: Visulaized relative distance of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC and under 
attack. 
 
Figure 61: Acceleration the Vehicle 3 (control signal) under ideal DSRC and under 
attack while packet dropping strategy applied (dashed green), DSRC under attack and no 
strategy applied (black) and DSRC under attack while DoS attack strategy applied 
(dashed red). 

















































































The provided results for this scenario, validates the necessity of essential decision 
making algorithm for choosing write strategy corresponding to the existing attack/network 
failure in the CPS. To achieve this objective along with maintaining the smooth driving 
profile, we developed the MPC strategy as (236) which provides the following results 
 
Figure 62: Behavior of the Vehicle 3 under ideal DSRC network (blue), and DSRC 
under attack scenario with resilient control strategies applied via optimum decision 
making algorithm (red). 
 
As it can be inferred from Fig. 62, the optimum decision making algorithm chooses 
suitable decision to have the keep the performance of the platoon close to the normal. 
Furthermore, the decision guarantees the safe relative distance as well as smooth driving 



































































behavior which is similar to deriving profile when the DSRC has ideal communication. The 
selected control action in each sample time is shown in Fig. 63. 
 
Figure 63: Selected control action during US06 driving cycle via decision making 
block. 
 
As it can be inferred from Fig. 63, in the first part of the driving cycle, when the 
DoS attack occurs in the DSRC network, the decision making block mainly chooses DoS 
strategy specially for critical points where Collison could happen such as 𝑡 =  110𝑠 or 𝑡 =
 118 𝑠, where we have higher acceleration or deceleration in the driving profile. However, 
after 𝑡 =  400 𝑠 when packet dropping is happening in the DSRC, the decision making 
chooses mainly packet dropping strategy to modify control strategy of the platoon.  
 










































SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS 
9.1. Dissertation Summary 
This dissertation is concerned with security of cyber physical systems with particular 
focus on connected vehicles. Despite being widely applicable in various industries and 
infrastructures, cyber physical system suffer from issues regarding to safety, security and 
reliability.  To improve the performance of the CPS, these issues should be addressed which 
requires good knowledge on attack modeling, cyber-attack detection and attack resilient 
strategies. Along with cyber-attacks, CPS also requires physical health monitoring with 
regard to physical faults as well as network failures. Motivated by this scenario, this 
dissertation proposed a set of hybrid strategies to make cyber physical systems resilient 
toward cyber-attacks as well as physical faults and network failures. These strategies are 
based on control/systems theory tools and physical models of the CPS that would be 
beneficial for maintaining the performance and functionality of the CPS in the presence of 
malfunction and cyber-attacks.  
In Chapter 2, a brief introduction has been given on working principle of connected 
vehicles and modeling of the connected vehicles equipped with Cooperative Adaptive 
Cruise Control (CACC). Next, in Chapter 3 we have a state- of- art- literature review on 
cyber-attacks modeling and security in cyber physical systems in occurrence of common 
cyber-attacks. The chapter also includes a brief review over diagnostics and observer design 
tools.  
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In Chapter 4, a sensor/actuator fault diagnosis problem is explored for a connected 
vehicle system under CACC. The diagnostic scheme has two sliding mode observers to 
detect, isolate and estimate different sensor faults in the individual vehicles; the CACC 
controller uses this estimated fault information to reconstruct the control signal. Therefore, 
inclusion of the diagnostic scheme essentially supplies the controller with more accurate 
information which in turn improves the overall safety of the connected vehicles. Simulation 
studies are presented which confirm the effectiveness of the diagnostic scheme. 
In Chapter 5, the diagnostic scheme has two components: 1) A sample hold strategy 
and 2) A Kalman filter-based estimation scheme to reconstruct the data under packet drop 
outs; the filter provides an improved estimate of the data received via communication 
network, which is in turn used by the CACC controller to construct the control signal. 
In Chapter 6, we proposed three algorithms to estimate the effect of denial of service 
attack as time delay. The first algorithm considers the statistic time delay as the effect of 
DoS attack, while, the latter two algorithms model DoS attack as the saturated attack with 
constant unknown delay. In first section of proposed research, an observer-based algorithm 
is presented for state estimation for vehicle platooning. The proposed algorithm consists of 
three main components including a Luenberger observer operates for ideal case of no attack 
in the system and a model-based observer and delay estimator for under-attack situation. 
This scheme is capable to detect DoS attack in DSRC communication network as well as 
estimating states of preceding vehicle for each car. Therefore, the modified CACC using 
estimated states can avoid potential dangers and present better performance. As future work, 
the scheme should be validated with experimental data. 
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In the second algorithm, we propose a real-time scheme for diagnosis of Denial of 
Service (DoS) cyber-attack in connected vehicles. Under DoS, the attacker keeps the 
communication network busy by sending fake requests and hence the network is unable to 
respond to legitimate requests from the real users. Specifically, the proposed scheme can 
potentially (i) detect the occurrence of DoS, and (ii) estimate its effect on the connected 
vehicle system. We model the effect of the attack by a time delay in the information 
processing via communication network. The main goal of the proposed scheme is to track 
this delay in information processing. The proposed scheme consists of a set of observers 
designed via sliding mode theory and adaptive observer theory. Simulation case studies are 
provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.  Furthermore, the robustness 
of the scheme is verified (i) under several forms of parametric uncertainties, and (iii) several 
measurement noise scenarios. 
In the third algorithm, we consider a more general problem with delay (as the effect 
of DoS attack) in cyber physical systems. Hence, an observer-based algorithm is presented 
to estimate the current states of a distributed cyber physical system while, only delayed 
measurements are available. The existing delay in the system measurements is a constant 
unknown value.  The proposed scheme consists of two separate components: (1) a PDE 
model- based adaptive observer to estimate the unknown constant delay in the system and 
(2) a Luenburger observer to predict the states of the system based on an estimated delay
obtained from the first observer. This scheme is capable of detecting and estimating 
unknown constant delay in cyber physical systems and estimate the correct states of the 
system despite delay. Hence, it is a valuable method for precise health monitoring 
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applications in CPS and for modifying the controller of the system to compensate the effects 
of the delay. As for future works, the scheme can be used to modify the control strategy of 
the system to compensate the impact of the delay in cyber physical and networked control 
systems. 
In Chapter 7, we considered a platoon of vehicles equipped with CACC strategy. 
The vehicles moving in a single straight line following their leader in a constant velocity 
and specific inter-vehicle distance. A continuous model using PDE approximation is 
developed to describe the dynamics of the platoon. Further, we modeled the false data 
injection attack in the platoon with injected ghost vehicles disturbing the local density 
perturbation characteristics of the platoon. To detect and isolate the false data injection 
attack into the platoon, we develop an observer based diagnostics algorithm. The proposed 
diagnostics scheme is developed based on PDE model and available measurements on 
velocity and acceleration of the vehicles in the platoon. Two residuals are derived from the 
presented scheme using the pre-define constant thresholds. The residuals behaviors are 
studied in both no attack and under attack scenarios and unique signature is developed for 
each scenario. Two case studies are conducted in the simulation results to illustrate the 
effectiveness of the presented algorithm. The results of these two scenarios verify the 
convergence of the PDE observer and demonstrate the capability of the algorithm to detect 
and isolate the injection point of the false data injection attack. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 we presented an MPC based algorithm to select among 
available control strategies based on (1) smooth driving and (2) safe relative distance to 
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compensate the effect of existing network failures/ cyber-attacks in the communication 
network. 
9.2. Future Works 
Experimental validation: None of the presented algorithms are validated with the 
experimental test due to the lack of suitable hardware to create the platoon of vehicle (or 
robots) sharing their information through the commination network. These algorithms 
should be validated by experimental studies. However, to do the same, new experimental 
methods should be developed based on CACC control strategy and DSRC network 
characteristics.  
Observer design for more comprehensive models: In the proposed algorithms and 
observer design, mainly we have assumed linear model of the platoon of connected vehicles. 
Although majority of the presented algorithms are based on control theories which are 
applicable to nonlinear systems e.g. sliding mode observer design, adaptive observer design, 
it would be good extension to apply the proposed tools to nonlinear model of platoon. 
More comprehensive attack modeling: Some of the modeling of the cyber-attacks 
or network failure can be more complicated from what is used in this thesis such as Morkov 
model for packet dropping and DoS model.  
Stochastic decision making strategy: The inherent of the cyber-attacks is not 
deterministic. Therefore, it will be more efficient to provide a stochastic decision making 
scenario to switch among the strategies e.g. game theory based algorithms. 
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